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Richter: A Standard for "Class of One" Claims Under the Equal Protection C

Notes
A STANDARD FOR "CLASS OF ONE" CLAIMS
UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:
PROTECTING VICTIMS OF NON-CLASS
BASED DISCRIMINATION FROM VINDICTIVE
STATE ACTION
The purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is to secure every person within the State's
jurisdiction against intentionaland arbitrarydiscrimination,
whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its
improperexecution through duly constitutedagents)
I. INTRODUCrION
Grace and Thaddeus Olech ("Olechs") occupied a single family
home in the Village of Willowbrook. 2 Until the spring of 1995, the
Olechs received their water from a private well on the property. 3 When
the well broke down beyond repair, they immediately requested to be
hooked up to the Willowbrook municipal water system. 4 The Village of
Willowbrook agreed to provide the Olechs with water; however, it

required them to grant a thirty-three foot easement for the construction
and maintenance of a roadway.5 The Olechs protested, believing that
this policy was unfair because the Village only required a fifteen foot

I Viii. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 1073 (2000), 120 S. Ct. 1073, 1074-75 (2000) (per
curiam)
(quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441,445 (1923)).
2
Olech v. Viii. of Willowbrook, No. 97 C 4935, 1998 WL 196455, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
April 13,
1998); Brief of Respondent at 3, Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000) (per
curiam) (No. 98-1288).
3
Respondent's Brief at 3, Olech (No. 98-1288).
IOlech, 1998 WL 196455, at *1. The Village of Willowbrook was required by law to provide
water to the Olechs on the condition that they paid for the costs of the project.
Respondent's Brief at 4, Olech (No. 98-1288). On July 11, 1995, the Olechs paid the Village
$7,012.67 for their share of the costs. Id.
5Olech v. Viii. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386,387 (7th Cir. 1998), affd, 120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000)

(per curiam).
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easement from other property owners for the construction of a water
6
main.
Meanwhile, the Olechs were forced to hook up an overground
rubber hose to their neighbor's well to obtain water for their house.7 In
the fall of 1995, the Village finally relented, and agreed to provide the
Olechs with water services in exchange for a fifteen foot easement. 8 In a
letter to the Olechs, the Village attorney conceded that a fifteen foot
easement would be sufficient. 9 By this time, it was too late to begin
construction of a water main.' 0 Their overground hose had frozen and
the Olechs, who were both in their seventies, spent the winter without
running water."
The lack of running water caused the Olechs to suffer great
inconvenience and mental and physical distress.12 Grace Olech filed a
claim in federal court against the Village and two Village officials, 13
alleging that she had been singled out for vindictive treatment because of
a prior lawsuit they had won against the Village six years earlier. 14 She
claimed that the prior lawsuit had generated substantial ill will toward
6Id. It is interesting to note that the Village of Willowbrook had already developed a plan
to require all home owners on the Olech's street who were not already hooked up to the
Village's water system to do so within two years. Respondent's Brief at 4, Olech (No. 981288). The plan did not contain a provision requiring land owners to grant an easement to
the Village. Id.
7
Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, No. 97 C 4935, 1998 WL 196455, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
April 13,
1998). The Olechs viewed this as a "temporary" way of obtaining water, and asked Village
officials to be hooked up to municipal water supplies "right away" because they knew that
their overground hose would freeze in winter. Id.
3Olech, 160 F.3d at 387.
9 Id. at 387-88. The Village attorney sent a letter to the Olechs on November 10, 1995,
informing them that, "[a) fifteen foot (15') easement, along with a temporary construction
easement of five feet (5') on each side, will be sufficient to install the water main. This is
consistent with Village policy regarding all other property in the Village." Brief of
Respondent at 6, Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000) (per curiam) (No. 981288). After receiving the letter, the Olechs granted the fifteen foot easement. Id. at 7.
1oOlech, 1998 WL 196455, at *2;
Respondent's Brief at 7-8, Olech (No. 98-1288).
11
Id.
12 Respondent's Brief at 8, Olech (No. 98-1288).
13Id. at 1. Grace Olech sued the President of Willowbrook and the Director of Public
Services of Willowbrook in their individual capacities. Id.
11
Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d at 386,387-88 (7th Cir. 1998). Thaddeus Olech has
since passed away, and his wife, Grace Olech, has continued to pursue legal recourse for
the Village's actions. Id. See genwrally Zimmer v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 610 N.E.2d 709 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993). In Zinrer, the Olechs, along with their neighbors, sued the Village for
damages as the result of storm water flooding their properties. Id. at 711. While they were
ultimately successful against the Village, the lawsuit generated substantial ill will toward
the Olechs on behalf of the Village. Oleci, 160 F.3d at 388.
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them on the part of Willowbrook and its officers.' 5 She alleged that the
ill will motivated the Village to single them out for disparate treatment
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
16
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Grace Olech's case represents a situation that many individuals
find themselves in as the result of irrational or vindictive treatment by
state or local government officials. 17 Individuals, such as the Olechs, are
singled out for differential treatment, causing physical and mental
anguish.' 8 One avenue of relief is a claim under the Equal Protection
Clause, which declares that a state government shall not "deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 19 While
this language has been interpreted to mean that all persons similarly
situated should be treated alike,20 it does not offer much guidance for
courts seeking to apply its principles. 21 Despite the lack of clear
standards, the Equal Protection Clause has traditionally been interpreted
to protect members of vulnerable groups and the exercise of
22
fundamental rights from arbitrary government conduct.
Recently, in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,23 the United States
Supreme Court affirmed that the Equal Protection Clause protects
individuals, as well as vulnerable groups and fundamental rights from

15Olech, 160 F.3d

at 388.
161d.
17 J.Michael McGuinness, Equal Protection for Non-Suspect Class Victims of Governmental
Misconduct: Teonj and Proof of Disparate Treatment and Arbitrariness Clahns, 18 CAMPBELL L.
REV. 333, 356 (1996). Professor McGuinness contends that the vast majority of Americans
have not been given some "special status or privilege" through suspect class or
fundamental rights protection. Id. See also infra notes 66-77 and accompanying text for an
explanation of suspect class and fundamental rights.
IS See, e.g., Brief of Respondent at 6, Viii. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct. 1073 (per
curiam) (No. 98-1288) (alleging that the Olechs suffered mental and physical distress
because they spent the winter without running water); Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176,178
(7th Cir. 1995) (contending that the mayor conducted a "campaign of vengeance" against
him by denying a license and causing the police to harass him); Rubinovitz v. Rogato, 60
F.3d 906,912 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding that local officials may have engaged in a conspiracy to
cause substantial harm to the plaintiffs for malicious reasons).
9
1 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
2 See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
21 McGuinness, supra note 17, at 334-35 ("The constitutional text offers virtually no
guidance into the meaning of equal protection."); see also Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of
Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537,542 (1982).
22 See infra Part IL.A for the traditional types of protection that the Supreme Court has
recognized under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
- 120 S. Ct. 1073,1074-75 (2000) (per curiam). See also supra note I and accompanying text.
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vindictive state action 24
This approach to Equal Protection
jurisprudence is referred to as a "class of one" claim. 25 Under this
theory, individuals like the Olechs, who have been victimized by state or
local officials, but who do not have a claim under a traditionally
recognized Equal Protection category, can file a claim in federal court
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.26 These claims arise when a state or local
government official inequitably administers a state statute or local
ordinance. 27 They often occur in the context of land use,28 zoning, 29
licensing, 30 and the provision of governmental services. 31

24Olech, 120

S. Ct. at 1074-75.
e.g., Id.at 1074 (using the term "class of one" to describe the plaintiff s claim); Bula v.
City of Antigo, No. 99-1765, 1999 WL 1136835, at *1(7th Cir. Nov. 16,1999) (referring to the
plaintiff's claim as a "class of one" claim); Staples v. City of Milwaukee, 142 F.3d 383, 387
(7th Cir. 1998) (recognizing the plaintiff's claim as a "class of one" Equal Protection case);
Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1995) (using the term "class of one" to refer to
individual claims under the Equal Protection Clause); Wroblewski v. City of Washburn,
965 F.2d 452 458 (7th Cir. 1992) (referring to the plaintiff's Equal Protection allegation as a
"class of one" claim).
1 See infra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
27 See, e.g., Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 387 (7th Cir. 1998), affd, 120 S. Ct.
1073 (2000) (per curiam) (alleging that Village officials required the plaintiff alone to grant a
nonstandard easement as a condition for municipal water services); Esmail, 53 F.3d at 178
(contending that the mayor singled the plaintiff out for the denial of a liquor license);
Rubinovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906, 908-09 (1st Cir. 1995) (alleging selective enforcement of
city building code regulations); LeClair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 608 (2d Cir. 1980)
(claiming selective treatment in the enforcement of a state regulation requiring dairy farms
to have clean water supplies).
2 Rubinovitz, 60 F.3d at 908-09 (alleging vindictive enforcement of zoning variance and
building code violations); Epstein v. Township of Whitehall, 693 F. Supp. 309, 312 (E.D. Pa.
1988) (claiming local officials maliciously impeded the development of their land).
29 LaTrieste Rest. and Cabaret, Inc. v. Vill. of Port Chester, 40 F.3d 587, 588-89 (2d Cir. 1994)
(contending malicious enforcement of zoning regulations); Masi Mgmt. v. Town of Ogden,
691 N.Y.S.2d 706, 717-18 (1999) (maintaining selective enforcement of zoning codes);
Thomas v. City of West Haven, 734 A.2d 535,538-39 (Conn. 1999) (alleging irrational denial
of application for zoning change).
30 Esinail, 53 F.3d at 180 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a vindictive denial of a liquor license
validly stated a claim deserving Equal Protection analysis); Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48
F.3d 674, 676-79 (2d Cir. 1995) (alleging malicious revocation of building permit was an
Equal Protection violation); LeClair, 627 F.2d at 608 (contending a farm license suspension
was a malicious state action in violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
31 Olech, 160 F.3d at 387 (alleging vindictive denial of municipal water services was an
Equal Protection violation); Front Royal and Warren County Indust. Park Corp. v. Town of
Front Royal Va., 135 F.3d 275, 277-79 (4th Cr. 1998) (claiming that municipality's failure to
provide sewer services implicated the Equal Protection Clause); Browning-Ferris Indust. of
S. Atlantic, Inc. v. Wake County, 905 F. Supp. 312, 314-16 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (maintaining that
the city's failure to provide a sewer line violated Equal Protection).
25 See,
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However, this approach is a relatively new form of Equal
Protection; thus, it remains unclear how lower courts should analyze
these claims.32 While several appellate courts have recognized an Equal
Protection claim for individuals based on malicious or vindictive state
action, 33 they have articulated conflicting standards for addressing and
analyzing these claims. 34 Furthermore, appellate courts have evaluated
"class of one" cases in the context of Rule 56 motions for summary
judgment and Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, but few have addressed
a "class of one" claim in a trial situation. 35 As such, these decisions

32 See infra Part III for the conflicting approaches to Equal Protection claims for vindictive

state action.
33See Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998), affd, 120 S. Ct. 1073
(2000) (per curiam) (finding an Equal Protection violation where the village singled out a
homeowner with vindictive treatment); Staples v. City of Milwaukee, 142 F.3d 383, 387 (7th
Cir. 1998) (recognizing non-suspect individual claims for arbitrary state action under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Indiana State Teachers Ass'n v.
Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 101 F.3d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The equal protection clause
does not speak of classes. A class, moreover, can consist of a single member."); Batra v.
Board of Regents, 79 F.3d 717, 721-22 (8th Cir. 1996) (acknowledging that arbitrary or
irrational state action that singles out an individual for different treatment can violate the
Equal Protection Clause); Esinail,53 F.3d at 179-80 (holding an individual can bring a claim
against a state official for vindictive action under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Rubinovitz, 60 F.3d at 911 (reaffirming that bad faith or malicious
intent to injure an individual violates Equal Protection); Yerardi's Moody St. Rest. &
Lounge, Inc. v. Board of Selectmen, 932 F.2d 89, 94 (1st Cir. 1991) (recognizing that
malicious or bad faith intent to injure an individual can violate Equal Protection); Zeigler v.
Jackson, 638 F.2d 776, 779 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that differential treatment without a
rational justification is arbitrary and violates Equal Protection); LeClair, 627 F.2d at 609-10
(stating that a state or local government official can violate the Equal Protection clause
when they single out an individual with the malicious or bad faith intent to injure); Torres
v. Frias, 68 F. Supp.2d 935,943 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (acknowledging that state action based upon
an illegitimate animus toward the plaintiff violates Equal Protection); Lockhart v. Cedar
Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist., 963 F. Supp. 805, 816 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (finding that the Equal
Protection Clause protects citizens from irrational or arbitrary state action); Masi, 691
N.Y.S.2d at 720-21 (recognizing individual or non-class based Equal Protection claims
motivated by malicious or bad faith intent to injure); Thomas, 734 A.2d at 551 (holding that
landowners established a prima facie case of selective treatment in violation of Equal
Protection); Penterman v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 565 N.W.2d 521, 534 (Wis. 1997)
(acknowledging that irrational and arbitrary state action can violate the Equal Protection
Clause).
N See infra Part Ill.
15See, e.g., Baumgardner v. County of Cook, No. 99-C5788, 2000 WL 1100438, at *13-16
(N.D. II1. Aug. 3, 2000) (evaluating a "class of one" claim in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss). In Baumngardner, the Court addressed the difference between a
Rule12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and the rational basis standard. Id. at *15. It contrasted the
Rule 12(b)(6) standard, which requires the plaintiff to prevail if relief could be granted
under any set of facts, with the rational basis standard under which the government wins if
any set of facts can reasonably be construed to justify the classification. Id. (citing
Wroblewski v. City of Washburn, 965 F.2d 452, 460 (7th Cir. 1992)). The Court found that
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provide a useful starting point for a "class of one" analysis, but they do
not provide a trial standard.
When it decided Olech, the Supreme Court failed to articulate a
clear standard. It provided the foundation for analyzing "class of one"
claims; however, it declined to decide the issue of whether a claim of
malicious or arbitrary treatment rises to the level of a constitutional
violation. 36 This Note addresses the difficulty of analyzing Equal
Protection "class of one" claims and calls for a much needed clarification
of the legal standards in "class of one" litigation. There are several
37
difficulties inherent in fashioning a standard for "class of one" claims.
First, "class of one" claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section

the rational basis standard will not prevent the plaintiff from prevailing on a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion. Id. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion is a procedural device that allows the plaintiff to
conduct discovery and move to trial, while the rational basis standard is the "substantive
burden" that the plaintiff will have to meet at trial. Id. The Court concluded that to decide
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion when evaluating an equal protection claim that is subject to rational
basis scrutiny, courts should determine if the plaintiff has alleged facts that are "sufficient
to overcome the presumption of rationality that applies to government classifications." Id.
(citing Wroblewski, 965 F.2d at 460). See also Viii. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S.Ct. 1073,
1075 (2000) (per curiam) (affirming the appellate court's denial of a 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss for failure to state a cognizable "class of one" claim); Hilton v. City of Wheeling,
209 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming the district court's granting of summary judgment
in a "class of one" claim); Bryan v. City of Madison, 213 F.3d 267, 277 (5th Cir. 2000)
(reviewing a summary judgment motion in a "class of one" claim); Esmail v. Macrane, 53
F.3d 176, 177 (7th Cir. 1995) (evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a "class of
one" claim); Rubinovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906, 909 (1st Cir. 1995) (analyzing the district
court's granting of summary judgment in a "class of one" claim). See itifra note 249 for the
summary judgment standard.
6 Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 1075 (2000) (per curiam) ("[Wle... do not
reach the alternative theory of ill will relied on by the [Seventh Circuit]."). See also Erwin
Chemerinsky, Suing the Governiment for Arbitranj Actions, 36 TRIAL 89,90 (2000) (finding that
the Court did not reach the issue of whether improper motive is enough to bring an Equal
Protection claim); Hilton, 209 F.3d at 1008 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that the Supreme Court left
the role of motive unclear when it decided Olech). But see Joseph Z. Flemming, Mt. Healthy,
Causation and Affinnative Defenses, 51 MERCER L REV. 637, 650 n.61 (2000) (stating that the
Supreme Court applied a strict test of motivation when it decided Olech).
37 Chemerinsky, supra note 36, at 90. Chemerinsky stated:
There are understandable reasons why the Court wanted to shy away
from the question of whether improper subjective motivation is
sufficient for a claim. It is easy for plaintiffs to allege such motivation
with the hope of gaining needed evidence during discovery and
persuading a jury at trial. The Court also may have been concerned
that issues of motivation focus on the governments actual purpose,
while rational basis review looks solely to whether there is a
conceivable permissible purpose for the government's action.
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1983").38 When a government official is sued under Section 1983, a court
may grant qualified immunity to officials under an objective test.39 The
integration of a subjective inquiry into an official's motivations with an
objective standard presents many challenges. 4°
Furthermore, it is
difficult to reconcile an inquiry into the subjective motivations of a
government official with the deferential rational basis standard that
controls "class of one" claims.41 This Note resolves these difficulties and
proposes that "class of one" claims should be analyzed under a
heightened rational basis standard.
Section IIof this Note discusses the history and development of
the Equal Protection Clause, with an explanation of how Equal
Protection claims are analyzed. 42 This Section also discusses early "class
of one" cases and traces their extension to administrative actions and
selective enforcement. 43 Section III of this Note describes how courts
currently analyze Equal Protection "class of one" claims for vindictive
state action. 44 This Section focuses on the different approaches that the
appellate courts presently use to analyze "class of one" claims, focusing
with particularity on the First, Second and Seventh Circuits. 4s Then,
Section IV looks at the Supreme Court's recent decision in Village of
Willowbrook v. Olech.46 It analyzes the test for qualified immunity and
proposes a standard for integrating the qualified immunity issues with a
substantive claim.47 Additionally, Section IV shows that "class of one"
claims can be analyzed under a heightened form of rational basis
review. 48 Section IV also discusses Substantive Due Process and shows
how it can serve as an additional claim for "class of one" plaintiffs who
are victimized by vindictive government action. 49 Finally, Section V
presents a Model Judicial Reasoning for courts to apply when they

'Is
See, e.g., Hilton, 209 F.3d at 1006 (utilizing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to allege a "class of one"

claim); Esmail, 53 F.3d at 177 (alleging a "class of one" claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983);
Rubinovitz, 60 F.3d at 910 (filing an Equal Protection claim for the "malicious or bad faith"
enforcement of the law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); LeClair, 627 F.2d at 607 (utilizing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 as the vehicle for a claim of selective enforcement).
39 See infra notes 243-86 and accompanying text.
40 See infra notes 276-77 and accompanying text.
41See Chemerinsky, supra note 36, at 90.
42See infra notes 52-88 and accompanying text.
4.See infra notes 89-127 and accompanying text.
-" See infra notes 128-86 and accompanying text.
45See infra notes 133-86 and accompanying text.
46 See infra notes 187-238 and accompanying text.
47
See infra notes 239-86 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 287-348 and accompanying text.
4
9See infra notes 349-63 and accompanying text.
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evaluate "class of one" claims at trial.50 Accordingly, Section V uses Ms.
Olech's claim that was presented in the Introduction as an example of
how the Model Judicial Reasoning would be implemented. 51
II. THE HISTORY

AND DEVELOPMENT OF EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS

A. Equal Protection Clause of the FourteenthAmendment
The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted after the Civil War to
52
protect the newly emancipated slaves from unequal treatment.
However, the Fourteenth Amendment was not used for almost a century
after its enactment because the Supreme Court rarely found that a state
or local action violated the Equal Protection Clause.5 3 The turning point
for Equal Protection jurisprudence came in 1954, when the Supreme
Court decided Brown v. Board of Education.Y
After Brown, the Supreme Court indicated an increased
willingness to hear claims of invidious discrimination under the Equal
Protection Clause.55 The Court has, in its modem case law, expanded the
scope of Equal Protection beyond race to include classifications such as

50 See infra notes 364-403 and accompanying text.
51See infra notes 364-403 and accompanying text.
52 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1880) ("One great purpose of [the Fourteenth
Amendment] was to raise [African-Americans] from that condition of inferiority and
servitude in which most of them had previously stood, into perfect equality of civil rights
with all other persons within the jurisdiction of the States."); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303, 306 (1880). In Strauder, the Court observed that the "true spirit and meaning" of
the Civil War Amendments was securing to a race recently emancipated enjoyment of all
civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by whites. Id. at 306.
The Court reaffirmed the core meaning of the Equal Protection Clause in the Twentieth
Century. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) ("A core purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to do away with all governmental discrimination based on race.");
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 220 (1971) ("There can be no doubt that a major purpose
of [the Fourteenth Amendment] was to safeguard [African-Americans] against
discriminatory state laws - state laws that fail to give (African-Americans] protection equal
to that afforded white people."); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385,391 (1969) ("[T]he core of
the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of meaningful and unjustified distinctions
based on race."). See also Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and
Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. REV. 245 (1997), for an in-depth analysis of the history of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
5
3ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 526 (1997).
N 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that separate educational facilities for white and
African-American school children violated the Equal Protection Clause).
See also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 53, at 526.
55 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 53, at 526. See also McGuinness, supra note 17, at 334 ("[l]n
recent years, the equal protection guarantee has become among the most important
constitutional sources for the protection of individual rights.").
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gender and illegitimacy and fundamental rights such as the right to vote
and access to the courts.5 6 In its most recent expansion of Equal
Protection jurisprudence, the Court affirmed that the Equal Protection
57
Clause protects individuals as well as members of suspect classes.
Currently, the main source of claims against a state or local
government official for invidious discrimination is the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 8 Under the Equal Protection
Clause, no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." 59 This provision requires that persons
similarly situated should be treated alike.6° Specifically, the Equal
Protection Clause protects against discriminatory action taken by states

and their subdivisions.61 While the Fourteenth Amendment does not
apply to the Federal Government, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

5 See infra notes 70-71, 78-79 and accompanying text.
S7

See generally Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S.Ct. 1073 (2000) (per curiam).

18See, e.g., Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998) (presenting a
claim of vindictive state action against an individual under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment), affd, 120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000) (per curiam); Rubinovitz, 60 F.3d at
909-10 (finding that a claim of malicious or bad faith intent to harm an individual is
actionable under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). See also infra
Part IV.D. for a discussion of how an individual can also bring a claim for vindictive or
malicious treatment under the Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
SU.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
6oPlyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). The Fourteenth Amendment does not demand
that all persons should be dealt with identically, however, exact or perfect equality is not
required. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,631-32 (1996). In Rorner, the Supreme Court stated,
"[t]he Fourteenth Amendment's promise that no person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws must coexist with the practical necessity that most legislation
classifies for one purpose or another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or
persons." Id.
While the Supreme Court has never attempted to define Equal Protection, scholars have
offered two models; one model looks at equal treatment, while the other model looks at
equal results. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 53, at 527 n.8. Under the equal treatment model,
the focus is on whether the government is treating people equally without discrimination.
Id. If so, Equal Protection is satisfied, even if the outcome is unequal. Id. In contrast, the
equal results model focuses on the outcome of the government's action. Id. Under this
approach, Equal Protection can be violated if a facially neutral law has a discriminatory
impact. Id.
61United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 25 (1960) (declaring as a "fundamental proposition"
that state officials of every rank are bound by the Fourteenth Amendment).
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Amendment is interpreted to provide the same protection against
discriminatory classifications by the Federal Government. 62
The Supreme Court presently analyzes Equal Protection claims
under three levels of scrutiny to determine if the state action violated the
Equal Protection Clause: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and
rational basis scrutiny.63 While traditional Equal Protection claims focus
on legislative classifications,64 the three tiered system of analysis also
applies to administrative decisions, such as "class of one" claims. 65 The
highest level of scrutiny is given to classifications that burden a suspect
class 66 or a fundamental right. 67 Suspect classes include race,64 alienage
6 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-99 (1954).

See also Kenneth L. Karst, The Fifth

Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C. L. REV. 541 (1977) (discussing the Fifth
Amendment's Equal Protection requirement).
63 Richard B. Saphire, Equal Protection, Rational Basis Review, and the Impact of Cleburne Living
Center, Inc., 88 KY. L.J. 591, 595-96 (1999-2000). Professor Saphire found that the basic
framework for equal protection analysis has been well settled for the past twenty-five
years. Id. He found that the Court uses three levels of scrutiny and that each "level...
entails a prescribed test with increasingly demanding requirements that must be satisfied if
the challenged classification is to withstand constitutional challenge." Id. at 596. The levels
of scrutiny demonstrate the leeway that policymakers have in "achieving societal goals."
Sean C. Doyle, Note, HIV-Positive, Equal Protection Negative, 81 GEO. L.J. 375, 383 (1992).
However, policymakers will not be granted a "presumption of benevolence" when
ignorance, bias, prejudice, or malice has influenced their decision. Id.
The three tiered approach to Equal Protection analysis has been criticized by some
Supreme Court Justices. See City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 451
(1985). In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens suggested that the Court's analysis of equal
protection classifications might be better characterized as a "continuum of judicial
responses to differing classifications." Id. at 451 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court's "rigidified approach" to equal protection analysis); Peter S. Smith,
Note, The Demise of Three-Tier Review: Has the United States Supreme Court Adopted a "Sliding
Scale" Approach Toward Equal Protection ]arisprudence?, 23 J. CONTEMP. L. 475, 478 (1997)
(arguing a sliding scale approach toward Equal Protection review is superior to the "single
test" approach).
61 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 453 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("In every equal protection case, we
have to ask certain basic questions. What class is harmed by the legislation, and has it been
subjected to a 'tradition of disfavor' by our laws?"); E & T Realty v. Strickland, 830 F.2d
1107, 1112 (1987) ("The first and most common type (of Equal Protection] is a claim that a
statute
discriminates on its face.").
65
See infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
6
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 53, at 550.
67 ld. at 638.

In Clebunze, the Court noted that race receives the highest level of scrutiny because the
classifications are "so seldom relevant" to a legitimate state interest, and because racial
discrimination is unlikely to be rectified by legislative means. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at
440.
Racial classifications have been challenged in a number of contexts. Facial challenges
have been made to laws that confer a disadvantage upon a group of people because of their
63
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or national origin. 69 Fundamental rights include the right to vote70 the
right to access to courts,71 the right to interstate travel, and the right to
race. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1979) (declaring unconstitutional a
law that limited jury service to white males over the age of twenty-one); Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (invalidating a law that prevented a mother from gaining custody
of her child when she married an African-American because it violated the Equal
Protection Clause). Challenges have also been made to laws that burden both whites and
racial minorities. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (holding unconstitutional a
state statute that forbade whites to marry racial minorities); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S.
399, 401-02 (1964) (finding a requirement that race be listed on a political candidate's ballot
implicated Equal Protection). Finally, laws that required separation of the races have been
struck down for violating Equal Protection. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495
(1954) (holding that separate educational facilities for white and African-American school
children violated the Equal Protection Clause); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City v.
Dawson, 350 U.S. 877, 877 (1955) (affirming that a law requiring segregation in public
beaches and bathhouses was unconstitutional).
Challenges have also been made to laws that are neutral on their face, but
discriminatory in their application. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976)
(finding a test for a position in the Washington D.C. Police Department that failed more
African-Americans than whites was constitutional absent discriminatory intent). This type
of challenge will be analyzed under strict scrutiny only if there is proof of a discriminatory
purpose. Id. at 239. Proof of discriminatory impact by itself will not trigger strict scrutiny
and the claim will be analyzed under the rational basis standard. Id. The requirement of
discriminatory intent means that a plaintiff has the initial burden of showing that the
government intended to discriminate. Personnel Admin. of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256, 281 (1979). That the government knew that there might be a discriminatory effect
is not enough. Id. at 279. In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977), the Supreme Court stated that a plaintiff can prove discriminatory intent by
showing that the law is so clearly discriminatory that there is no other explanation, by
showing statistical discrimination, or by showing a discriminatory purpose through the
legislative history of the laws. Id. at 264-68. See also infra notes 383-88 and accompanying
text.
69See Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 606 (1976) (invalidating a statute that
permitted only U.S. citizens to practice engineering under strict scrutiny); Sugarman v.
Dougall, 413 US. 634, 647 (1973) (declaring a flat ban that prevented aliens from holding
civil service jobs unconstitutional); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973) (reaffirming
that strict scrutiny is the standard for alienage classifications); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365,371-72 (1971) (stating that classifications based on alienage are inherently suspect).
70 See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969) (holding that "exacting
judicial scrutiny" should be used to evaluate statutes that determine who can vote); Harper
v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (affirming that the right to vote is a
fundamental right); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) (stating that "the right of
suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society . . . any alleged
infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously
scrutinized.").
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348-55 (1996) (alleging a violation of the right of access to
courts); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19-20 (1956) (holding that states must provide
indigent criminal defendants with a trial transcript).
72 Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55,65 (1982) (finding a program that favored established state
residents over new state residents violated the Equal Protection Clause); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969) (stating that the right to travel or migrate interstate
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privacy.73 These classifications are subject to "strict scrutiny." 74 Under
strict scrutiny, the classification will be upheld only if the government
can show that it is necessary to promote a compelling government
interest 75 and that the goal cannot be met through less discriminatory
means.7 6 Strict scrutiny is a difficult standard for the government to
meet; thus, it is almost always fatal to a challenged law. 7
Classifications that involve gender78 and illegitimacy 79 receive a
slightly lower level of scrutiny, 80 commonly referred to as "intermediate

is constitutionally protected); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966) (stating that
the right to travel is a "fundamental right"). While the right to intrastate travel is analyzed
under strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court has stated that the right to foreign travel is not a
fundamental right; therefore, it should only be analyzed under rational basis. See Haig v.
Agee, 453 U.S. 280,306 (1981).
73 Privacy rights include the right to marry, Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978), the
right to control the upbringing of one's own children, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214
(1972), the right to refuse medical treatment, Cruzan v. Director,Missouri Dept. of Health,497
U.S. 261, 278 (1990), the right to be free from government interference in choosing to have
an abortion under limited circumstances, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852
(1992), and the right to use contraceptives, Eisenstadtv. Baird,405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
74 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 53, at 550. These categories are subject to the highest level of
scrutiny because they involve group traits that are irrelevant to a state interest and often
involve injury to politically powerless groups. Doyle, supra note 63, at 381-82.
75
City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986);
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
76 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280 ("Under strict scrutiny the means chosen to accomplish the State's
asserted purpose must be specifically and narrowly tailored to accomplish that purpose.").
7 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 53, at 529 (citing Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 TennForeward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Oanging Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972)).
7 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (stating that parties who seek to defend
a gender-based classification must show an "exceedingly persuasive justification"); J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127,135 (1994) (analyzing a gender-based classification under
intermediate scrutiny); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982)
(stating that an intermediate level of scrutiny should be used for gender-based
classifications); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding classifications based on
gender are subject to intermediate scrutiny). Intermediate scrutiny is used to evaluate laws
that discriminate against men as well as laws that discriminate against women. For
example, in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, the Court declared that a state
nursing school that was available only to women was unconstitutional under intermediate
scrutiny. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724.
7Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (stating that intermediate scrutiny is used for
classifications based on illegitimacy); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.. 91,99 (1982) (stating that
an intermediate level of review is used for illegitimacy); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265-66
(1978) (analyzing an illegitimacy claim under intermediate scrutiny).
8D Id.
Courts apply intermediate scrutiny when a "classification, while not facially
invidious, nonetheless gives rise to recurring constitutional difficulties." Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 217 (1982).
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scrutiny." 81 To survive intermediate scrutiny, the government must
show that the classification is substantially related to a sufficiently
important government interest.82 If the government cannot meet this
83
burden, the classification will not pass constitutional evaluation.
All other classifications, most notably those that involve social
and economic classifications, receive the lowest level of scrutiny.84 This
is referred to as "rational basis" review and, under this standard, the
party attacking the legislation bears the burden of proof.85 A rational
basis classification is presumed to be valid as long as it is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest.8 The courts are deferential to the

8' CHEMERINSKY,

supra note 53, at 529.

Craig, 429 U.S. at 197-98 (finding that gender classifications must serve "important
governmental objectives" and must be "substantially related to achievement of those
objectives"); Mills, 456 U.S. at 99 (finding that classifications that involve illegitimate
children will not pass equal protection scrutiny unless they are substantially related to a
legitimate state interest).
V3Craig, 429 U.S. at 204 (invalidating an Oklahoma statute that prohibited the sale of 3.2%
beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18 because the
relationship between gender and traffic safety was "too tenuous" to be substantially related
to the statutory objective); Mills, 456 U.S. at 100-01 (finding that a Texas statute which only
allowed illegitimate children one year to establish paternity violated Equal Protection
because it was not substantially related to a legitimate state interest).
f See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (finding that the states are given wide latitude in
regulating social or economic matters); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1980)
(stating that local social and economic legislation is analyzed under the rational basis
standard). Rational basis review is also applied to classifications such as age, Vance v.
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979), MassachusettsBd. of Retirement v. Murgia,427 U.S. 307,313-14
(1976), disability, Cleburne,473 U.S. at 446, wealth, Dandridgev. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 48586 (1970), and sexual orientation, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-96 (1986), Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-32 (1996).
8 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 53, at 530. See also Saphire, supra note 63, at 597. Saphire found
that the rational basis standard has been the most stable of the three standards. Id. It is the
oldest and most basic standard that all classifications must satisfy. Id.
86
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). In Romer, the Court described the rational basis
standard:
[Elven in the ordinary equal protection case calling for the most
deferential of standards, we
insist on knowing the relation
between the classification adopted and the object to be attained. The
search for the link between classification and objective gives
substance to the Equal Protection Clause; it provides guidance and
discipline for the legislature, which is entitled to know what sorts
of laws it can pass; and marks the limits of our own authority.
Id.
Under the rational basis test, a legitimate state interest can consist of interests
traditionally within the "police powers" of a state, such as safety, public health, or public
morals. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) (finding that the Sunday sale
of exempted commodities was necessary for the "health of the populace"); Ry. Express
Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109-11 (1949) (stating that a New York City traffic
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government under this standard of review, 87 and it will uphold a
classification so long as there is a conceivable basis for it.M
B. The Development of Equal Protection "Class of One" Claims
The "class of one" concept was recognized by the Supreme
Court in its rudimentary form in the Nineteenth Century.89 Early cases
addressed arbitrary treatment in the context of administrative action. 90
They served as the impetus for later selective enforcement claims under
Equal Protection. 91 The following Section traces the development of
"class of one" jurisprudence from its origins in administrative action
claims to the concept of selective enforcement.
1. The Emergence of "Class of One" Claims in Administrative Actions
While many Equal Protection claims are based upon legislative
classifications, "class of one" claims usually arise when a state or local

regulation forbidding any one to operate an advertising vehicle was enacted for public
safety reasons, thus it did not violate Equal Protection). Even though it is rare, the
Supreme Court has stated that there are impermissible state objectives. For example, a
state cannot enact legislation where it desires to harm a politically unpopular group. See
United States Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973); Romer, 517 U.S. at 634-35.
This principal will be developed in Part IV.C. of this Note to show how "class of one"
claims can be analyzed under the rational basis standard.
87Saphire, supra note 63, at 598 (stating that rational basis review entails a great degree of
judicial deference). See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Tie Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword:
hnplemnenting the Constitution, 111 HARv. L REV. 56, 79 (1997) (finding that rational basis
review is a "virtual rubber stamp"); FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314
(1993) (stating that rational basis review is the "paradigm of judicial restraint").
88Beach Comuninucations, Inc., 508 U.S. at 313. In Beach, the Court went so far as to say,
"those attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden to 'negate
every conceivable basis which might support it.'" Id. at 315. See also Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911) (finding a challenged classification will fail only
if it is completely arbitrary).
9 See Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31 (1879) (finding that the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment "means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the
same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same
place and under like circumstances"); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Matthews,
174 U.S. 96, 104 (1899) (" [Tihe equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution forbids the
legislature to select a person.., and impose upon him.., burdens and liabilities which are
not cast upon others similarly situated."). See also McFarland v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 241
U.S. 79, 86 (1916). In McFarland,the Court used "class of one" language when it found that
a statute "bristl[ed] with severities that touch[ed] the plaintiff alone," and stated that a
legislature could not enact a statute directed toward a particular individual or corporation
unless there was a rational basis for doing so. Id. The Court held that the statute was
invalid because it was a "purely arbitrary" exercise of legislative power. Id.
90 See infra notes 92-127 and accompanying text.
9'See infra Part II.B.2.
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official applies a facially neutral law in a discriminatory manner.92
However, the Equal Protection Clause requires the fair application of
laws as well as impartial legislation. 93 This principle was established in
1886 by Yick Wo v. Hopkins.94 In Yick Wo, the Supreme Court evaluated a
San Francisco ordinance that required laundry operators to obtain
permission to operate from the Board of Supervisors unless the laundry
was located in a brick or stone building.95 The statute was facially valid,
but was enforced primarily against the Chinese as a means to shut down
their laundry facilities. 96 The Court was concerned that the Board was

92McGuinness, supra note 17, at 334-35. In his article Professor McGuinness states that

while much of the focus in Equal Protection litigation is on legislative classifications, the
more common context in which an individual needs protection is where the government
acts arbitrarily through administrative action. Id. See also Saphire, supra note 63, at 600 n.
34 ("Equal protection analysis is not confined to formal legislation."); and supra note 25 for
a list of cases where the courts have heard claims for the discriminatory application of laws
to individuals under the Equal Protection Clause.
93There are three broad categories of Equal Protection claims. E & T Realty v. Strickland,
830 F.2d 1107, 1112 n.5 (11th Cir. 1989). The most common claim is when a statute is
discriminatory on its face. Id. When this occurs, the court will analyze the claim under the
appropriate level of scrutiny to determine if the statute violates the Equal Protection
Clause. Id. The second type of claim occurs when the neutral application of a facially
neutral law has a disparate impact. Id. To succeed with this type of challenge, a plaintiff
must show discriminatory intent. See also supra note 68 for an explanation of how these
types of Equal Protection challenges apply to race-based classifications for an
understanding of these concepts in practice. The third type of claim is when a facially
neutral statute is administered is a discriminatory way. E &T Realty, 830 F.2d at 1112 n.5. It
is this category that most "class of one" claims fall into. The appellate courts have heard
many cases involving Equal Protection claims against state or local governments for their
administrative actions. See, e.g., Front Royal & Warren County Indus. Park Corp. v. Town
of Front Royal, 135 F.3d 275, 289-290 (4th Cir. 1998) (evaluating Equal Protection claim
based on town's refusal to provide sewer service); Bannum, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale,
157 F.3d 819, 823 (11th Cir. 1998) (challenging city's denial of special use permit); Mahone
v. Addicks Util. Dist., 836 F.2d 921, 936-37 (5th Cir. 1988) (alleging a local utility board's
refusal to provide water violated the Equal Protection Clause); Carolan v. City of Kansas
City, 813 F.2d 178, 181-82 (8th Cir. 1987) (contending enforcement of building code
implicated Equal Protection).
- 118 U.S. 356 (1886). See J. Michael McGuinness, Decisions of the Past Decade Have Expanded
Equal Protection Beyond Suspect Classes, 72 FEB. N.Y. ST.B.J. 36 (2000) (finding that Yick Wo is
the cornerstone for Equal Protection).
Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 357. The ordinance stated, in pertinent part
Section 1. It shall be unlawful, from and after the passage of
this order, for any person or persons to establish, maintain, or carry
on a laundry within the corporate limits of the city and county of
San Francisco without having first obtained the consent of the
board of supervisors, except the same be located in a building
constructed either of brick or stone.
Id. (citing Order No. 1,569 (May 26, 1880)).
9 Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 372-74. The petitioners in Yick Wo, Chinese laundry owners, were
imprisoned for violating the ordinance. Id. at 359. They appealed to the Supreme Court,
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abusing its powers in the administration of the law.97 Accordingly, it
declared that unequal and unjust discrimination in the administration of
the laws violated the Equal Protection Clause.9
The Court subsequently addressed a "class of one" claim
involving administrative action when it decided Snowden v. Hughes99 in
1944.100 In Snowden, the petitioner brought an Equal Protection claim
against the Illinois State Election Board ("the Election Board"), alleging
that it had willfully and maliciously refused to list him as a candidate for
representative in the General Assembly.' 01 Initially, the Court analyzed
the Equal Protection claim by stating that the petitioner's right to be a
candidate for office was created by a facially neutral state statute. 102 The
Court found that the administration of a facially neutral statute would
not violate the Equal Protection Clause unless the plaintiff could show an
"element of intentional or purposeful" discrimination in the application
of the statute.10 3 Similarly, the Court stated that a statute could

contending that their Equal Protection rights were violated by the application of the
ordinance. Id. at 369.

97 Id.at 369-70. Regarding the discriminatory application of the law, the Court commented:
For, the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or
the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of

life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country
where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself.

Id. at 370.
" Id. at 374. The Court found that the denial of permits to Chinese immigrants was based
solely on the ill will of the board, and declared that the imprisonment of the petitioners was

illegal. Id.
321 U.S. 1 (1944).
1%)
Id.
Im Id. at 3-6. The petitioner was running for the office of representative in the Illinois
General Assembly as a Republican candidate. Id. at 3. According to proportional
representation in the petitioner's district, two candidates for representative in the General
Assembly were to be nominated on the Republican ticket for that district. Id. The results of
the primary election showed that the petitioner had received the second highest number of
votes. Id. According to Illinois Statute, the candidate who received the highest number of
votes was to be declared nominated. Id. The petitioner contended that because he was the
candidate with the second highest number of votes, he should have received the
nomination for the second representative from his district. Id.at 4. The Election Board
only listed one nominee for the office of representative in the General Assembly, and the
petitioner claimed that they "willfully, maliciously, and arbitrarily" left him off of the
nomination ballot in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
102
Id.at 7.
10 Id.at 8. The Court declared:
The unlawful administration by state officers of a state statute fair on
its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to
be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is
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discriminate on its face, if a plaintiff could show that one class or
individual was preferred over another in its application.1°4 Finally, the
Court stressed that discriminatory intent is not to be presumed, but must
be shown by clear and convincing evidence.10 s However, after analyzing
the claim, the Court found that the petitioner's allegations of willful and
malicious application were insufficient to show purposeful
discrimination, and held that the petitioner's Equal Protection rights
were not violated. 06

shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful
discrimination.
Id.
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944). See supra note 93 for the ways in which a
statute can violate the Equal Protection Clause. "Class of one" claims usually involve
statutes or regulations that are neutral on their face, but violate Equal Protection in their
application to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Rubinovitz, 60 F.3d at 909 (alleging improper
enforcement of lawful zoning regulations); LeClair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 608 (2d Cir.
1980) (condemning the selective enforcement of a lawful state regulation). If a legislative
action specifically singles an individual or a particular group out for punishment, it is a bill
of attainder. See Micheal P. Lehmann, The Bill of Attainder Doctrine: A Survey of Decisional
Law, 5 HASTINGS CONsr. L.Q. 767, 790 (1978) ("[Tjhe... definition of a bill of attainder has
four distinct components: it is (1) a legislative act (2) imposing punishment (3) upon a
designated person or class of persons (4) without the benefit of a judicial trial."). A bill of
attainder is similar to a "class of one" claim because the United States Constitution forbids
a legislature from singling out an individual or group for vindictive treatment. U.S. CONST.
art. 1, § 9, d. 3 (stating "[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed").
105
Snowden, 321 U.S. at 8. The Court supported its standard by analogizing to two different
types of Equal Protection claims. Id. at 8-9. First, the Court discussed intentional
discrimination in the context of racial classifications. Id. The Court stated that an Equal
Protection violation by the exclusion of African-Americans from a jury can be proven by
extrinsic evidence of "purposeful discriminatory administration" of a statute that is fair on
its face, but that a mere showing that African-Americans were not included on the jury is
not enough. Id.
Second, the Court discussed property valuation for tax rates. Id. at 9. The Court stated
that tax assessors violate the Equal Protection Clause when they do not assess similar
property under a uniform standard of valuation. Id. To violate the Equal Protection
Clause, over or under valuation of property must be due to purposeful discrimination,
which can be evidenced by systematic under-valuation of some property, while similar
property can be systematically overvalued. Id. Tax cases decided since Snowden have
continued to hold that property assessment that discriminatorily values similar property at
different values violates Equal Protection. See, e.g., Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v.
County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336, 345 (1989) ("The Equal Protection Clause... protects the
individual from state action which selects him out for discriminatory treatment by
subjecting him to taxes not imposed on others of the same class."); Hillsborough v.
Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 623 (1946) ("The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects the individual from state action which selects him out for
discriminatory treatment by subjecting him to taxes not imposed on others of the same
class.").
106Snowden, 321 U.S. at 10.
10
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The Second Circuit relied upon the holding in Snowden in 1946,
when it decided Burt v. City of New York.10 7 In Burt, the plaintiff, an
architect, appealed from the dismissal of a complaint alleging that the
New York Building Department ("the Department") singled him out for
unlawful oppression when they denied his building permits.1 8 The
Second Circuit found that the Department deliberately abused its
statutory powers because it selected the plaintiff for oppressive
treatment. 109 The court made this finding because the Board approved
the applications of other architects similarly situated.11 0 The court
further stated that a deliberate abuse of power by a state official would
not be enough to bring a "class of one" claim; the plaintiff must show
evidence of "purposeful discrimination.""' Overall, the court found
that there was sufficient evidence of purposeful discrimination, and
remanded the case for further proceedings." 2

1117156

F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1946).

Id. The plaintiff was a registered architect who practiced in the State of New York. Id.
As part of his employment, he was required to make applications to the Building
Department to gain approval for his work. Id. He brought a "class of one" claim against
the Department alleging that they abused their powers when they failed to approve his
applications and imposed upon him other unlawful conditions. Id.
108

109Id.
110 Id.

The court found that the plaintiff had been "singled out" for unlawful oppression
when the Board denied his applications and imposed unlawful conditions upon him, while
it approved the applications of other architects similarly situated. Id.
M Id. at 791-92. The court relied on the holding in Snowden when it required a showing of
purposeful discrimination stating, "the decision definitely settled it, that, if a complaint
charges a state officer, not only with deliberately misinterpreting a statute against the
plaintiff, but also with purposely singling out him alone for that misinterpretation, it is
good.... " Id. at 792.
12 Burt v. City of New York, 156 F.2d 791, 793 (2d Cir. 1946).
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13
2. "Class of One" Claims in the Context of Selective Enforcement'

After Snowden, the Supreme Court did not specifically address
"class of one" claims under the Equal Protection Clause until Village of
Willozwbrook v. Olech." 4 However, it subsequently addressed individual
Equal Protection claims in the context of selective enforcement. 1 5 Under
the Equal Protection Clause, an individual can bring a claim for the
selective enforcement of an otherwise valid law or regulation when the
enforcement amounts to "purposeful discrimination."1 1 6 The Supreme
Court articulated the standard for selective enforcement in Wayte v.
United States.117 In Wayte, the Court evaluated the government's passive
enforcement policy of prosecuting individuals who failed to register
with the Selective Service, but only if they reported themselves to
authorities or if others reported them." 8 The petitioner claimed that his
indictment under this policy was unlawful selective prosecution." 9
113It is important to note that many courts interchange the term selective enforcement with
the term selective prosecution. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598,607-610 (1985)
(interchanging the terms prosecution and enforcement); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448,456-57
(1962) (using the terms selective prosecution and selective enforcement synonymously);
Leclair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 608 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that "appellees charge boils
down to one of selective enforcement or prosecution by a state official pursuant to a lawful
state regulation"). The words are also used synonymously in Black's Law Dictionanj.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1363 (7th ed. 1999). However, the word prosecution, has a
distinct meaning from the word enforcement. Id. at 1237. Prosecution can be used to mean
the commencement and carrying out of a legal action, or it can mean to institute and
pursue criminal action. Id. Enforce means to give force or effect to a law, or to compel
obedience to. Id. at 549. Therefore, use of these two words can create confusion; and it is
necessary to clarify that when the term selective prosecution is used in this Note to describe
a particular court's reasoning, the focus of this Note is on selective enforcement. For an
overview of basic selective enforcement cases, see J. Michael McGuinness, lack-Booted
Government Thugs Beware: Litigating Equal Protection & Selective Enforcement Claims, PLI/LIT.
387, 396-97 (1997). For further explanation of selective prosecution, see Richard Bloom,
Twenty-Eighth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: i. PreliminaryProceedings: Prosecutorial
Discretion, 87 GEO. L.J. 1267 (1999).
114120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000) (per curiam).
I'5 Claims for selective enforcement usually arise in the context of a criminal prosecution or
regulatory enforcement action. Futernick v. Sumpter Township, 78 F.3d 1051,1056 (6th Cir.
1996). In a selective prosecution or enforcement claim, the burden is on the plaintiff to
show: (1) membership in a protected group; (2) prosecution; (3) that others in a similar
situation would not be prosecuted; and (4) that the prosecution was initiated with
discriminatory intent. United States v. Anderson, 923 F.2d 450,453 (6th Cir. 1991).
"1 Futernick, 78 F.3d at 1056. See infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text for an
explanation of what comprises a forbidden standard.
117470 U.S. 598 (1985).
" Id. at 600-01.
Under

the Military Selective Service Act, the President issued a
proclamation ordering male citizens to register with the Selective Service System. Id. The
petitioner refused to do so, stating in a letter to both the President and the Selective Service
System:
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When deciding Wayte, the Court addressed the two types of
selective prosecution or enforcement 20 The first type occurs when the
government fails to prosecute all known offenders. 121 The Court stated
that this type of claim was not actionable under the Equal Protection
Clause.122 The Court found that the government has broad discretion
when deciding whom to prosecute, and that the exercise of selectivity in
law enforcement does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation."23
Next, the Court defined the second form of selective
enforcement, which occurs when the state prosecutes an individual
based upon membership in a vulnerable group or other "arbitrary
classification." 124 Under the second form, Equal Protection violations

I decided to obey my conscience rather than your law. I did not

register for your draft. I will never register for your draft. Nor will I
ever cooperate with yours or any other military system, despite the
laws I might break or the consequences which may befall me.
Id. at 601 n.2. Selective Services gave the petitioner several chances to comply with the

proclamation, but he refused, after which Selective Services indicted him for knowingly
and willfully failing to register for the draft. Id.
at 602-03.
,1Id. at 604. The petitioner moved to dismiss his indictment on the grounds that he and
other indicted opponents of the policy were impermissibly targeted for prosecution
because they were "vocal" opponents of the program. Id.
120 Id. at 607-10. See also Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962); Futernick v. Sumpter
Township, 78 F.3d at 1051,1056-58 (6th Cir. 1996); Esinail v.Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 178-79 (7th
Cir. 1995); and Dubuc v. Green Oak Township, 958 F. Supp. 1231, 1236 (E.D. Mich. 1997) for
an explanation of selective enforcement.
121 Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607-08. This can occur as a result of ineptitude, lack of adequate
resources, Esinail, 53 F.3d at 178-79, when the government wants to run a test case, Mackay
Telegraph & Cable Co. v. City of Little Rock, 250 U.S. 94,100 (1919), or when the government
wants to deter individuals from certain actions, Cook v. City of Price, 566 F.2d 699, 701 (5th
Cir. 1977).
122 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). The Court declared, "[s]o long as the
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by
statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a
grand jury rests entirely in his discretion." Id. See also Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456 ("[T]he
conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional
violation.").
123Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607-08. In Wayte, the Court stated:
This broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the
decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review.
Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general
deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the
case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan
are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are
competent to undertake.
Id. at 607. See also United States v. Brock, 782 F.2d 1442, 1444 (7th Cir. 1986) (giving broad
discretion to the prosecutor).
124Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608. See also Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456.
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also occur when the state uses enforcement as a means to punish
individuals for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right, such as
the right to free speech or the free exercise of religion.l2 5 Accordingly,
the Court found that the plaintiff must show that the enforcement had a
126
discriminatory effect and was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.
It concluded that the petitioner did not meet the burden of proof, and
held that government's passive enforcement policy did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause. 127 After Wayte, the appellate courts formed
their own standards for "class of one" claims.
III. CURRENT EQUAL PROTECTION THEORIES FOR VINDICTIVE GOVERNMENT
TREATMENT

While the Supreme Court recently recognized "class of one"
claims under the Equal Protection Clause, 128 it did not articulate a clear
standard. 129 However, "class of one" claims have been analyzed in the
appellate courts for several decades. 13° These cases provide a useful
starting point for determining the elements. The main proponents of
"class of one" jurisprudence have been the First, Second, and Seventh
Circuits.131 While their theories are similar, they are theoretically
distinct. The following Section discusses these approaches and shows
132
why they are different.

125 Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608. See also United States v. Rendondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296, 1298

(9th Cir. 1992) (stating that a claim of gender-based selective prosecution violates Equal
Protection); United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 706 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that the
initiation of a prosecution against persons exercising their constitutional rights creates an
inference of discrimination); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1212, 1225 (1st Cir.
1987) (holding that the government cannot prosecute based on faith).
121 Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608-09. In articulating this standard, the Court relied on Personnel
Adn'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See infra notes
384-89 and accompanying text for the significance of Arlington Heights.
127Wayte, 470 U.S. at 610, 614 (1985).
121 See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000) (per curiam); Kenneth W.
Simons, The Logic of EgalitarianNormns, 80 B.U. L. REV. 693, 733 (2000) (finding the Court
recently recognized "class of one" Equal Protection claims in Olech); Equal Protection:
Supreme Court Permits Claim by Class of One, 29 MAY REAL EST. L. REP. 3 (2000) (stating that
the Court in Olech held that a plaintiff does not have to allege membership in a class or
group to bring an Equal Protection claim).
129See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
1I" See infra notes 133-86 and accompanying text.
131See infra notes 133-86 and accompanying text.
12
. See infra notes 162-65 and accompanying text. See also supra note 33 for other circuits that
have recognized "class of one" claims. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Village of
Willowbrook v. Olech, the Sixth Circuit did not recognize "class of one" claims. See, e.g., Bass
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A. The First and Second Circuit's Selective Enforcement or "Malicious Intent

to Injure" Standard
The Second Circuit expanded upon selective enforcement when
it created an Equal Protection claim to protect an individual singled out
for malicious or bad faith law enforcement. 33 The court announced its
Equal Protection standard in the landmark case of LeClair v. Saunders.134
In LeClair, the appellees, a husband and wife, owned a dairy farm in
Vermont.13 They brought an Equal Protection claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging the selective enforcement of a dairy farm regulation that
required the farms to have sanitary water supplies. 136 The appellees

v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1050 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding invidious discrimination must be
based on membership in a protected class to violate the Equal Protection Clause); Futernick
v. Sumpter Township, 78 F.3d 1051, 1057-59 (6th Ci. 1996) (stating that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect individuals who are not
members of a suspect class or exercising a fundamental right); Joyce v. Mavromatis, 783
F.2d 56 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that an individual must be a member of a class or group
singled out for discriminatory treatment to allege an Equal Protection violation); Dubuc v.
Green Oak Township, 958 F. Supp. 1231, 1238 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (reasoning that the Equal
Protection Clause is not implicated unless the discriminatory practice is directed toward a
suspect classification).
In Futernick, the Sixth Circuit stated that an individual could not bring an Equal
Protection claim for selective enforcement based upon "malice or personal animosity"
unless he or she was a member of a suspect class 'or was prevented from exercising a
constitutional right. Futernick, 78 F.3d at 1057. The court reasoned that the presence of
personal animosity should not turn a valid enforcement action into a constitutional
violation. Id. at 1059. The Futernickcourt stated that victims of arbitrary government action
have recourse in the state courts, and allowing claims of selective prosecution under the
Equal Protection Clause would bring what are essentially issues of local law and policy
into the federal courts. Id.
The Sixth Circuit's approach in Futernickwas sharply criticized by some commentators.
See, e.g., McGuinness, supra note 17, at 349-50. When addressing the Sixth Circuit's decision
in Futernick, McGuinness stated "[it seems difficult to believe that the court seriously
suggested that the appointing authority for the governmental official would provide relief
for a victimized citizen. The court in Fitternick does not apparently recognize the inner
workings of local politics and patronage throughout America." Id.
" See, e.g., LeClair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1980). See also John R. Williams,
Representing Plaintiffs in Civil Rights Litigation Under Section 1983, 5% PLI/Lrr 117, 204
(1998) (stating that selective enforcement can be a basis for Section 1983 litigation under
Equal Protection).
114627 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1980). This form of Equal Protection is derived from Burt v. City of
New York, 156 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1946). See supra notes 107-12 for the facts and holding of
Burt. See also McGuinness, supra, note 94, at 37 ("Judge Hand's conclusion and analysis in
[Burt] provided fertile ground for the Seconds Circuit's expanded recognition of Equal
Protection in LeClair.").
1.,
LeClair,627 F.2d at 607. The appellees owned a 235-acre, 50-cow dairy farm. Id.
m Id.The Massachusetts regulation required all dairy farms shipping milk into the state to
undergo an annual inspection for sanitary conditions. Id. The regulation required all water
supplies to be, "easily accessible, adequate, and of a safe sanitary quality." Id. The
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argued that they were selected for unequal treatment because, out of ten
or eleven farms with unclean water supplies, they were the only farm to
be suspended. 137 After a two day jury trial, the district court ordered
$39,375 to be paid in damages. 138 The defendant appealed the original
1 39
verdict and the damage award to the Second Circuit.
The Second Circuit prefaced its analysis by acknowledging that
the plaintiffs claim was "lodged in a murky corner of equal protection
law" in which there were "no clearly delineated rules to apply." 14 It
recognized that the plaintiffs alleged selective enforcement or
prosecution was based on the discriminatory administration of a
statute. 141 However, the court reasoned that the claim did not fit into the
traditional categories of selective enforcement because the plaintiffs had
not alleged that they were singled out for their membership in a suspect
class or for the exercise of a fundamental right.142
To solve this problem, the court borrowed concepts from
qualified immunity and from selective prosecution to create a new
"malicious intent to injure" standard. 143 Relying on Wood v. Strickland,144
appellees, the LeClairs, owned a farm with an inadequate water source, using a visibly
open and dirty pond as the water supply for their milk room. Id. After the inspector
warned the appellees about the inadequacy of the water supply, he suspended the
LeClair's farm. Id. at 608. This forced the LeClair's to stop shipping their milk to
Massachusetts, which put their farm out of business. Id.
1.7Id. The LeClairs contended that they were singled out for selective treatment because
ten or eleven farms in the area had unclean water supplies. Id. Of those farms, only two
were suspended, the LeClairs and another farm, and the other farm was quickly reinstated.
Id.
138LeClair, 627 F.2d at 607. After the trial, the jury returned a verdict for the LeClairs' and
awarded $44,152 in damages. Id. The district court ordered a new trial on the damages,
where they were lowered to $39,375. Id.
Id. The LeClair's cross-appealed the district court's order for a new trial on the damages
I."
and the denial of costs and attorney fees. Id. The Second Circuit examined the record to
determine if there was sufficient evidence to survive a motion for a directed verdict Id. at
610.
140
Id. at 608. The court distinguished the LeClair's claim from traditional Equal Protection
claims that involve a statute that is unconstitutional on its face. Id. The Second Circuit
stated that if the allegations involved a facial attack on the statute, the appellees would
"almost certainly" have lost because a state has the police power to regulate public health.
Id. Instead, the court found that the claim was one of "selective enforcement or prosecution
pursuant to a lawful state regulation." Id.
141Id.
142

Id. at 610. See supra Part II.B.2 for an explanation of the traditional categories of selective
enforcement.
14.1
LeClair, 627 F.2d at 606, 608-10. The court stated that, "the doctrine of immunity and the
law of equal protection intersect in determining whether appellant is liable for damages in
this § 1983 action." Id.at 608.
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the court stated that government officials are entitled to qualified
145
immunity from lawsuits under Section 1983 for "reasonable mistakes."
At the same time, the Wood standard did not allow courts to grant
qualified immunity for actions based on "whim or caprice." 14
The Second Circuit further relied on the standard for selective
enforcement articulated in Moss v. Hornig.14 7 InMoss, the court held that
to prove the unequal administration of a facially neutral statute, the

1- 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
115LeClair, 627 F.2d at 608. The Supreme Court recognizes two types of immunity for
government officials under Section 1983: absolute and qualified. Jeffery J. McKenna,
Prosecutorial linintinity: Ibler, Burns, and Now Buckley v. Fitzsinmmiotis-The Supreme Court's
Attempt to Provide Guidance in a Difficult Area, 1994 BYU L. REV. 663, 666 (1994). The
procedural difference between the two types of immunity is important. Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 (1976). Absolute immunity defeats a suit at the outset, while
qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that bars action only when the official can
show that his or her actions did not violate clearly established constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known. Id. See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818-19 (1982). Generally, government officials are protected by qualified immunity.
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27-28 (1991) ("This Court has refused to extend absolute
immunity beyond a very limited class of officials.").
See infra notes 243-50 and
accompanying text for further explanation of absolute and qualified immunity.
46
1 LeClair, 627 F.2d at 609. The Court in Wood stated:
[A]n official is not immune from liability for damages under § 1983 if
he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took
within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the
constitutional rights of the [one whose rights are] affected, or if he took
the action with the malicious intention to cause a depravation of
constitutional rights or other injury ....
Wood, 420 U.S. at 322. In Wood, the Court held that an official is not protected by qualified
immunity if he or she knew or reasonably should have known that their actions were
undertaken with malicious intent. Id. Thus, under Wood, the test for qualified immunity
consisted of two parts. Id. The objective prong of the test stated that an official's defense of
qualified immunity could be overcome by a showing that the plaintiff's constitutional
rights had been violated, and the subjective prong stated that a public official could lose his
or her immunity upon a showing of malice. Id.
From the test in Wood, the Second Circuit inferred that a government official with
qualified immunity can be held liable for acting with malicious intent to injure a person in
a "nonconstitutional" sense. LeClair, 627 F.2d at 609. However, the Supreme Court has
since abandoned the subjective prong of the test for qualified immunity. Harlow, 457 U.S.
at 818. In Harlow, the Court established a purely objective standard for granting qualified
immunity in which an official was liable only if he or she violated a clearly established
statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. Id. See
also infrd notes 254-66 and accompanying text.
147314 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1963). In Moss, the plaintiff brought an action against a state official
under Section 1983 for selectively enforcing Sunday closing laws only against his business.
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148 The
plaintiff must show "intentional or purposeful discrimination."
Second Circuit superimposed the two standards to create a "malicious or
bad faith intent to injure" claim through selective treatment. 149 The
Second Circuit required the plaintiff to prove that: (1) the person,
compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2)
that such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations
such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of
constitutional rights, or "malicious or bad faith intent to injure" a
person15 0 After analyzing the plaintiff's claim under this test, the court
reversed the district court and held that the plaintiffs failed to show that
the allegedly selective treatment was based upon malice or a bad-faith
intent to injure. 151

148Id. at 92. The Second Circuit relied on United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir.
1974), to clarify the "intentional or purposeful discrimination" standard. Id. In Berrios, the
court stated that to prove selective prosecution, the defendant must show:
(1) that, while others similarly situated have not generally been
proceeded against because of conduct of the type forming the basis of
the charge against him, he has been singled out for prosecution, and
(2) that the government's discriminatory selection of him for
prosecution has been invidious or in bad faith, i.e. based upon such
impermissible considerations as race, religion, or the desire to prevent
his exercise of constitutional rights.
Id.
149 LeClair, 627 F.2d at 609-10.
15 Id. The Second Circuit explained that in applying the test, the malice or bad faith
standard must be "scrupulously met." Id. at 611.
151Id. at 610-11. The court found that the appellees did not allege that they were suspended
because of their race, nationality, religion, or exercise of a constitutional right. Id. at 610.
Therefore, the court reasoned that the appellees would have to show malicious or bad faith
intent to injure through selective treatment of their farm. Id. The Second Circuit examined
six pieces of evidence that the LeClairs presented at trial on the issue of malice:
(1) that the other 10 or 11 farms were treated differently from the
LeClairs'; (2) that Saunders, [the inspector], wanted appellees to
connect the well without knowing it was adequate; (3) that Saunders
knew about the well in 1970 or 1971, but only suddenly in 1975
decided to push them to connect it; (4) that Saunders intentionally
appeared at the end of 1975 so as to make it impossible for them to
meet the deadline for approval; (5) that Saunders was in a spiteful
mood at the time of the December 1975 inspection because he had had
a run-in earlier in the day with another farmer; and (6) that the March
1976 special reinspection was unusually meticulous and detailed.
Id. The Court concluded that these elements did not provide enough evidence that the
inspector maliciously intended to harm the LeClairs. Id. at 610-11. It reversed the findings
below. Id. at 611.
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The First Circuit refined the Second Circuit's "bad-faith or
malicious intent to injure" test when it decided Rubinovitz v. Rogato'52 in
1995. The plaintiffs in Rubinovitz appealed to the First Circuit after their
Section 1983 claim for the selective enforcement of building code
provisions was dismissed on summary judgment. 153 The First Circuit
began its analysis with the first element of the LeClair test. It stated that
Equal Protection plaintiffs must show that persons who are similarly
situated "in all relevant aspects" were treated differently to prove that
they had been singled out for unlawful enforcement.' 54
After concluding that the plaintiffs satisfied the first element, the
court analyzed the second LeClair element for evidence of "bad faith or
malicious intent to injure." 55 In doing so, it expressed the concern that
something more than a single act of malice underlying a routine
administrative action should be necessary to make out an Equal
Protection claim for selective enforcement. 5 6 To address this concern,
the First Circuit looked for a "malicious[ly] orchestrated campaign
causing substantial harm." 157 After examining the facts, the court held
that the case could not be resolved on summary judgment because a

Ms60 F.3d 906, 911-12 (1st Cir. 1995). For other cases using the "malicious or bad faith
intent to injure" standard, see Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 683-85 (2d Cir. 1995),
LaTrieste Rest. and Cabaret, Inc. v. Village of Port Chester, 40 F.3d 587, 590 (2d Cir. 1994),
Yerardi's Moody St. Rest. and Lounge, Inc. v. Boardof Selectmen of the Town of Randolf, 932 F.2d
89, 92 (1st Cir. 1991), and Heille v. City of St. Paul, 512 F. Supp. 810, 815 (D. Minn. 1981).
153Rubinovitz, 60 F.3d at 908-09. The Rubinovitzes were the owners of a garage-style
apartment. Id. They brought a claim against the defendants, city officials in Lynn,
Massachusetts, after the city revoked a previously granted zoning variance, and imposed
several building code violations. Id. These events occurred after the Rubinovitzes evicted a
tenant for violating her lease. Id. at 908. The tenant was friends with the city purchasing
director, who pressured other city agencies to bring action against the Rubinovitzes. Id. at
908-09.
134Id. at 910. The court stated, "[p]laintiffs claiming an equal protection violation must first
'identify and relate specific instances where persons situated similarly in all relevant
aspects were treated differently, instances which have the capacity to demonstrate that
(plaintiffs] were singled... out for unlawful oppression.' " Id. at 910 (quoting Dartmouth
Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1989)). The court found that there
was no basis in the record by which it could determine if the Rubinovitzes were singled out
for "unlawful oppression," but stated that they had a possible claim for selective
enforcement. Rubinovitz, 60 F.3d at 910.
ImRubinovitz, 60 F.3d at 911.
1-6 Id. at 912.
157Rubinovitz,

60 F.3d at 912. While the court looked for an orchestrated campaign, it did
not decide whether it was necessary to plead this element in every claim. Id. However, the
court found that it would be difficult for plaintiffs to bring claims under the "malicious
intent" standard. Id. (stating that "[plaintiffs] are likely to have rough sailing").
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reasonable jury might be able to conclude that there was an orchestrated
conspiracy to harm the plaintiffs.ls 8
B. The Seventh Circuit's "Vindictive Action" Theory
While the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the theoretical
approach of the First and Second Circuits, it built upon their basic
principals to create an Equal Protection claim for the vindictive
enforcement of state or local laws. It recognized this type of Equal
Protection violation in Esmail v. Macrane15 9 The plaintiff in Esmail
brought a claim under Section 1983, alleging that the town mayor
violated his Equal Protection rights when he denied him a liquor license
and granted licenses to others similarly situated. 160 The plaintiff claimed
that the mayor singled him out for discriminatory treatment based on
"sheer vindictiveness." 161
158Id.

("[We think that although the case might be a difficult one for the plaintiffs, a
reasonable jury might well be able to conclude that there was an orchestrated conspiracy
involving a number of officials, selective enforcement, malice, and substantial harm.").
159 53 F.3d 176, 177 (7th Cir. 1995). For the precursor to Esinail, see Ciechon v. City of Chicago,
686 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1982). See also Williams, supra note 133, at 209. Williams notes that
the Seventh Circuit has a "history of creativity in this area." Id. He speculated that this
could be attributed to the nature of political life in Illinois. Id. It is interesting to note that
the Seventh Circuit has not always recognized "class of one" claims, suggesting in some of
its earlier cases that an Equal Protection class must have more than one member. See, e.g.,
Herro v. City of Milwaukee, 44 F.3d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that an equal
protection claim must include an allegation of class-based discrimination); New Burnham
Prairie Homes, Inc. v. Vill. of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474, 1481 (7th Cir. 1990) ("A person
bringing an action under the Equal Protection Clause must show intentional discrimination
against him because of his membership in a particular class, not merely that he was treated
unfairly as an individual."); Smith v. Town of Eaton, 910 F.2d 1469, 1473 (7th Cir. 1990)
(stating that "an equal protection claim must be based on 'intentional discrimination
against [the plaintiff] because of his membership in a particular class, not merely [because]
he was treated unfairly as an individual'") (citations omitted).
160Esinail, 53 F.3d at 177. The plaintiff Esmail owned a liquor store in the City of Naperville
for several years when the city notified him that his annual liquor license would not be
renewed. Id. The city denied Esmail's license on the grounds that he served liquor to a
minor, that one of his managers had failed to register according to a municipal code, and
that he failed to disclose on the renewal that his license had previously been revoked. Id.
The mayor, who is also the liquor control commissioner in Naperville, found Esmail guilty
on almost all of the charges and denied his application for a liquor license. Id. After he
exhausted his administrative remedies, Esmail filed a claim in state court. Id. The state
court subsequently ordered that Esmail be granted a liquor license and found that he was
only guilty of having an unregistered manager on the premises for an hour and a half, a de
nitirnits violation. Id.

161Id. at 178. Esmail claimed that the mayor and other city officials harbored a "deep
seated" animosity toward him, in part because he initiated an advertising campaign
against the sale of liquor to minors which accused the city of ineffectual law enforcement,
and in part because he withdrew his political and financial support from the mayor. Id.
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The Seventh Circuit began its analysis in Esmail by discussing
the traditional categories of selective prosecution. 62 However, the court
did not acknowledge the First and Second Circuit's "malice or bad-faith"
addition to the traditional categories. 163 Instead, the court found that the
plaintiff in Esmail had not plead a claim of selective prosecution. 164 It
reasoned that his claim was different because it was not a claim of
unequal treatment. 65 Rather, the plaintiff alleged "an orchestrated
campaign of official harassment directed against him out of sheer
malice." 1' By creating a new Equal Protection claim, the court deviated
from the First and Second Circuit's approach. 167 Under the Seventh
Circuit's claim, a wronged individual can bring a claim in federal court
when he or she has been singled out for "vindictive" treatment by a
government official. 168 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that, "Jiff the
power of government is brought to bear on a harmless individual merely
because a powerful state or local official harbors a malignant animosity
69
toward him, the individual ought to have a remedy in federal court."
Overall, the court admitted that the type of claim brought by the
plaintiff did not fit into the Equal Protection tradition of claims based
upon group classifications. 170 However, it justified its new classification
by stating that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is not limited to protecting members of identifiable

Esmail claimed that the mayor denied his liquor license for these reasons, granting new
liquor licenses to others who had engaged in similar conduct. Id. at 177. For example, the
mayor granted a license to an individual who had a conviction for a felony drug charge,
and whose manager had served a four-year sentence in federal prison on drug charges. Id.
162 Id. at 178-79. See supra Part II.B.2 for an explanation of selective prosecution or
enforcement.
1," But cf. McGuinness, spra note 94, at 36 (finding that Esinail drew on Second Circuit
cases).
161Esinail, 53 F.3d at 179. The court found that the case was not plead as a claim of selective

prosecution, but was framed as an "orchestrated campaign of official harassment directed
against him out of sheer malice." Id.
165 Id.

Im Id.
167 Id. See also Penterman v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 565 N.W.2d 521, 534 (Wis. 1997)
(acknowledging a "third type of equal protection claim recognized by the Seventh Circuit
in Esinail').
I" Esiail, 53 F.3d at 179. While announcing that this principle was "sound," the Seventh
Circuit admitted that it could be "subject to abuse by persons whose real complaint is
selective prosecution in the sense that it is not cognizable in suits to enforce the equal
protection clause." Id.
169Esmail, 53 F.3d at 179. The Seventh Circuit relied upon City ofCleburne v. Clebu rne Living
Otr, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) for this proposition. Id. See infra notes 300-09 and
accompanying text for the facts and holding of Clebure.
170Esinail, 53 F.3d at 180.
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groups."' The court reasoned that a "class of one" is likely to be the
most vulnerable classification, and therefore in need of the most
protection. 172 When addressing the standard, the Seventh Circuit stated
that the plaintiff had the burden of proving that the state's action was a
"spiteful effort to 'get' him for reasons wholly unrelated to any
legitimate state objective." 173 It reasoned that this standard was sound
because it was more demanding than the probable cause standard for the
tort of malicious prosecution. 174 The court concluded that the plaintiff
stated a claim, and that the case should not have been dismissed by the
district court. 75
The Seventh Circuit revisited the issue when it decided Olech v.
Village of Willowbrook"76 in 1998.' 7 The plaintiff in Olech brought a claim
against the Village of Willowbrook after the Village refused to honor her

Id. at 180. The court stated that the suit was not barred by the "class of one rule" because
there is "no such rule." Id.
172 Id. at 180. The Seventh Circuit declared that, "a class of one is likely to be the most
vulnerable of all, and we do not understand therefore why it should be denied the
protection of the equal protection clause." Id. See also Albright v. Oliver, 975 F.2d 343, 348
(7th Cir. 1992) ("Indeed, one might suppose that the smaller the class, the less able it would
be to protect itself in the political arena, and therefore the greater the danger that it might
be singled out for oppression."). The Seventh Circuit found that while the plaintiff was able
to obtain relief in the state courts, the claim has a place in the federal courts because in
many instances powerful state and local officials are able to use their power to "overawe"
state or local courts. Esiotail, 53 F.3d at 180.
171 Esinail, 53 F.3d at 180. Judge Posner reasoned that the proposed standard was more
demanding than having to show probable cause, which is the meaning of malice in a tort
action for malicious prosecution. Id. For example, to prevail on a claim of malicious
prosecution in Illinois, the plaintiff must show that (1) "the defendant brought the
underlying suit maliciously and without probable cause; and (2) the former action was
terminated in his or her favor; and (3) some 'special injury' or special damage beyond the
usual expense, time or annoyance in defending a lawsuit." Cult Awareness Network v.
Church of Scientology Int'l, 685 N.E.2d 1347,1350 (111. 1997).
174Esmail, 53 F.3d at 180.
175 Id.
' 160 F.3d 386 (7th Cir. 1998), afftd, 120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000) (per curiam). For additional
explanation of the Seventh Circuit's approach to vindictive Equal Protection claims see
Indiana State Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Sch. Comnmn'rs of the City of Indianapolis,101 F.3d 1179
(7th Cir. 1996).
7
7 Olech, 160 F.3d at 388. See also Payton v. Rush Presbyterian-St.Luke's Med. Ctr., 184 F.3d
623, 632 n. 7 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that "class of one" claims "provide a last-ditch
protection against governmental action wholly impossible to relate to legitimate
governmental objectives...") (citations omitted); Pleva v. Norquist, 195 F.3d 905, 917 (7th
Cir. 1999) (analyzing a "class of one" claim under the Esinail standard); Levenstein v.
Salafsky, 164 F.3d 345, 353 (7th Cir. 1998) (explaining the theory behind "class of one"
claims). See also infra note 202 and accompanying text for further "class of one" claims
decided by the Seventh Circuit.
171
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request to provide municipal water services. 1 8 The Village would not
provide the house with sewer services unless she gave the Village a
thirty-three foot easement, rather than the standard fifteen-foot
easement179 The plaintiff refused to grant the nonstandard easement,
and as a result, went without water for three months1 80 The Village
finally relented and hooked the plaintiff up to its water, requiring only a
fifteen-foot easement. 181 The plaintiff claimed that the Village violated
her Equal Protection rights because it singled her out for a larger
easement based upon "substantial ill will" generated by an earlier
2
lawsuit that the plaintiff had brought against the Village.18
The district court dismissed the case because the complaint did
not allege an "orchestrated campaign of official harassment" motivated
by "sheer malice." 183 The Seventh Circuit found that it was not necessary
for a "class of one" plaintiff to allege an orchestrated campaign of
harassment. 84 Rather, the plaintiff must allege that the government
official acted out of an illegitimate desire to "get" him or her based upon

Olech, 160 F.3d at 387. See supra notes 2-16 and accompanying text.
17 Id. When the plaintiff's private well broke, she asked the Village to hook-up her house
up to its municipal water system. Id. The Village agreed to do so, but only if the plaintiff
would grant it a thirty-three foot easement to widen the road in front of the plaintiff's
house. Id. This requirement deviated from the Village's normal requirement of a fifteenfoot easement for water hook-up. Id.
"'

'5 Id.

18"Olech v. Viii. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 387-88 (7th Cir. 1998), ajffd, 120 S. Ct. 1073

(2000) (per curiam). See supra note 9 for the text of the Village's letter to Olech.
112Olecli, 160 F.3d at 387. In the prior lawsuit, the plaintiff sued the Village for flood
damages caused by the Village's negligent installment and enlargement of culverts near
her property. Id. The plaintiff's suit was successful, and she obtained damages from the
Village. Id. See also Zimmer v. Viii. of Willowbrook, 610 N.E.2d 709 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
'8 Olech, 160 F.3d at 388. See also Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, No. 97 C 4935, 1998 WL
196455, at *1 (N.D. 111.April 13, 1998).
18 Olech, 160 F.3d at 388. The Seventh Circuit found that a requirement of "orchestration"
is not necessary in vindictive action Equal Protection claims and further stated that the
short duration of the depravation is not important. Id. (citing Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d
176 (7th Cir. 1995)).
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prior lawful actions.185 The Seventh Circuit found that the case could not
be disposed of based on the pleadings, and reversed the district court. 186
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN VILLAGE OF WILLOWBROOK V. OLECH
AND ITS AFTERMATH

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Olech to
decide whether the Equal Protection Clause creates a cause of action for
"class of one" plaintiffs, or plaintiffs who have not alleged membership
in a protected class or group.187 In a per curiam opinion, Village of
Willowbrook v. Olech,188 the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause
protects "class of one" plaintiffs from unequal treatment. 8 9 The Court
wrote a brief analysis, finding that prior cases had successfully
recognized "class of one" claims where the plaintiff alleged that he was
intentionally treated differently from others who were similarly situated
and that there was no rational basis for the treatment. 19° The Court

183Olech, 160 F.3d at 388. In "vindictive action" claims, the plaintiff has to allege that the
official action was not the result of prosecutorial discretion, which is not actionable under
the Equal Protection Clause, but the result of an illegitimate desire to "get" him. Id. The
Seventh Circuit was concerned that the creation of a federal claim for municipal
"squabbles" might flood the federal courts with litigation. Id. The court found, however,
that the plaintiff's required showing of differential treatment based upon a "totally
illegitimate animus" was sufficient to prevent such an onslaught, stating that a mere
"tincture of ill will" is not sufficient to invalidate a government action. Id.
18Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388-89 (7th Cir. 1998), affd, 120 S.Ct. 1073
(2000) (per curiam) The court stated that it might be possible to dispose of the case short of
trial, but it could not be dismissed based solely on the pleadings. Id. at 388.
137 Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 1074 (2000) (per curiam). In a footnote to
the case, the Court acknowledged that the plaintiff's allegations could be interpreted to
present a class of five. Id. The Olech's neighbors were also singled out for a thirty-three
foot easement instead of the standard fifteen-foot easement because of alleged ill will from
a prior law suit. Id. The Court stated that this factor was irrelevant because the number of
individuals in a class does not matter for Equal Protection analysis. Id.
1M Id.
18 Id. at 1074-75.
9 Id. The Court only relied upon two prior cases to support its holding, Sioux City Bridge
Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441(1923) and Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Conn'n
of Webster County, 488 U.S. 336 (1989). Id. In Sioux City, the Supreme Court decided
whether the defendants violated the plaintiff's Equal Protection rights when they singled
out the plaintiff for a higher tax rate. Sioux City, 260 U.S. at 441-42. The Court found that
the Equal Protection Clause protects individuals from "intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper
execution through duly constituted agents." Id. at 445 (quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v.
Township of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 352 (1918)). Based upon this finding, the Sioux City
Court remanded the case to determine if the defendant had intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff in his/her tax assessment. Sionx City, 260 U.S. at 447.
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reasoned that Ms. Olech's claim satisfied these requirements when she
alleged that the Village intentionally demanded a thirty-three-foot
easement while other property owners were only required to provide a
fifteen-foot easement. 191 The Court further reasoned that allegations of
"irrational and wholly arbitrary" state action were sufficient to state a
92
claim for relief under traditional Equal Protection standards.
Justice Breyer wrote a concurring opinion to address the concern
that plaintiffs would flood the federal courts with state and local
claims. 193 He found that a rule which required an intentional difference
in treatment and a lack of a rational basis might allow inconsequential
claims into federal court.194 He reasoned that the allegation of an extra
element, "vindictive action," would minimize the chances of turning a
"run of the mill" zoning claim into a constitutional claim. 195
Accordingly, he concurred with the majority in recognizing a "class of
one" claim. 196
However, the Court, by its own admission, failed to address the
Seventh Circuit's theory of "subjective ill will." 197 While it found that
allegations of irrational and arbitrary state action were sufficient to state

In Allegheny, landowners challenged the valuation of their property for tax purposes,
alleging that the systematic under valuation of neighboring property violated the Equal
Protection Clause. Allegheny, 488 U.S. at 342. The Court found that the petitioner's
property was assessed at roughly eight to thirty-five times more than similar property in
the community. Id. at 344. The Court held that there was no rational basis for the
distinction, stating "[t]he equal protection clause.., protects the individual from state
action which selects him out for discriminatory treatment by subjecting him to taxes not
imposed on others of the same class." Id.at 345. (citation omitted).
191Olech, 120 S. Ct. at 1075.
191Vili. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 1075 (2000) (per curiam). The Court
affirmed the Seventh Circuit's denial of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, finding that Ms. Olech
had presented a sufficient claim. Id.
19.1Id.
' Id.Justice

Breyer used the example of zoning violations to illustrate his point. Id. He
found that zoning decisions almost always treat one land owner differently from others
and that a rule that only looks for an intentional difference in treatment and the lack of a
rational basis would not prevent insubstantial claims from proceeding to federal court. Id.
However, he reasoned that Ms. Olech's claim was different because it included an
allegation of "ill will" or "illegitimate animus." Id.
'19 Id. He found that Ms. Olech's claim resembled Esinail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176 (7th Cir.
1995), because she alleged that the Village's action was motivated by "ill will." Id. See
supranotes 159-75 and accompanying text for the facts and holding of Esinail.
11 Olech, 120 S. Ct. at 1075.
19 Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 1075 (2000) (per curiam) ("We therefore
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, but do not reach the alternative theory of
'subjective ill will' relied on by that court.").
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a claim, the Court did not determine if allegations regarding motive,
such as ill will or vindictive action, were a necessary part of the
plaintiff's prima facie case.9 8 Furthermore, the Court did not mention
the First and Second Circuit's "malicious or bad faith intent to injure"
standard in its opinion. By glossing over these theories, the Court failed
to clarify its reasoning or provide a workable standard for "class of one"
claims.99
Indeed, since Olech, the Seventh Circuit has reaffirmed its
standard for vindictive state action. In Hilton v. City of Wheeling,"20 the
court drew upon its decision in Olech when it confirmed that "vindictive
action" cases require proof of a "totally illegitimate animus" toward the
plaintiff from the defendant. 20 1 Subsequent cases in the Seventh Circuit
have continued to cite to Hilton, Esmail, and Olech and use the
"illegitimate animus" standard of proof. 2 Likewise, the district courts

19Olech, 120 S. Ct. at 1075.
I" See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
211 209 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2000). In Hilton, the plaintiff complained that unequal police
protection violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 1007. He alleged that the police cited
or arrested him for disorderly conduct, battery, and violating noise ordinances fifteen
times, while complaints by him against his neighbors went unanswered. Id. at 1006.
201 Id. at 1008. The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed that "vindictive action" cases require "proof
that the cause of the differential treatment of which the plaintiff complains was a totally
illegitimate animus toward the plaintiff by the defendant." Id. at 1008 (citing Olech v. Vill.
of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998), afd, 120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000) (per curiam)).
The Court found that the plaintiff had not pled a "class of one" claim because he failed to
allege that the police action was motivated by an illegitimate animus. Hilton, 209 F.3d at
1008.
22 See, e.g., Fojtik v. Vill. of Spring Grove, No. 98C-50360, 2000 WL 776888, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill.
May 26, 2000) (evaluating a "class of one" claim under the "vindictive action" standard);
Kevin v. Thompson, No. 99C-7882, 2000 WL 549440, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 2000) (finding
that a "class of one" plaintiff must allege vindictiveness or an illegitimate animus to
survive a motion to dismiss); Singleton v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., No. OOC-395,
2000 WL 777925, at *9-10 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 2000) (clarifying that to withstand a motion to
dismiss, a "class of one" plaintiff must allege treatment that is: "(1) based upon sheer
vindictiveness or spite; and (2) wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective"); Alberio
v. City of Kankakee, 91 F.Supp.2d 1208,1213 (C.D. Ill. 2000) (stating that "vindictive action"
cases require proof that the state action was motivated by an illegitimate animus toward
the plaintiff).
Other jurisdictions have also decided "class of one" claims since the Supreme Court
decided Olech. See Bryan v. City of Madison, 213 F.3d 267,276-77 (5th Cir. 2000) (affirming
the dismissal of a "class of one" claim for lack of evidence of improper motive); Alsenas v.
City of Brecksville, No. 99-4063, 2000 WL 875717, at *2 (6th Cir. June 19, 2000) (upholding
the dismissal of a "class of one" claim because the plaintiff failed to allege that there was no
rational basis for the decision); Shipley v. Internal Revenue Serv., No. Civ. A. 99-2331-KHV,
2000 WL 575019, at *8 (D. Kan. March 30, 2000) (dismissing a "class of one" claim for failure
to allege differential treatment); Michelfelder v. Bensalem Township Sch. Dist., No. Civ. A.
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in the First and Second circuits have also remained true to their
standard. 2m3 They have continued to cite to the LeClair "malicious or bad
2 °4
faith intent to injure standard" when evaluating "class of one" claims.
The Supreme Court's lack of guidance in Olech leaves many
unanswered questions. It is not clear what the plaintiff's burden of proof
should be in presenting this type of case. Further, courts have been left
with little guidance on how to evaluate legitimate "class of one
claims." 20
These issues are further complicated by the theoretical
framework that surrounds Equal Protection litigation.
An Equal
Protection "class of one" claim is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.206 As a
defense, a government official can receive qualified immunity from suit
unless he or she violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional
right of which a reasonable person would have known.- 7 This objective
standard appears to conflict with a subjective inquiry into an official's
intent or motivation. 208 However, it is difficult to determine if an
individual has been singled out for discriminatory treatment without
examining subjective intent or motivations.
Furthermore, "class of one" claims are restricted by judicial
review. Under Equal Protection analysis, "class of one" claims do not
trigger heightened scrutiny; therefore, they receive rational basis
review. 20 9 When evaluating claims under the rational basis standard,
courts must accord great deference to the government's reasons for
taking an action.210
They are reluctant to consider the subjective
motivations of officials when determining if there is a legitimate
government purpose for the challenged classification. 2- This makes it
difficult to determine if the action was motivated by malice or ill will.

99-4621, 2000 WL 892866, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 30,2000) (recognizing that a "class of one" can
bring an Equal Protection claim).
211Katz v. Stannard Beach Ass'n, 95 F. Supp. 90, 95 (D. Conn. 2000) (analyzing a "class of
one" claim under the LeClair malice or bad faith intent to injure standard); Roth v. City of
Syracuse, 96 F. Supp. 2d 171, 178-79 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing the "malice or bad faith intent
to injure" standard); Economic Opportunity Comm'n of Nassau County, Inc. v. CEDC, Inc.,
106 F. Supp. 2d 433, 439-41 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (utilizing the LeClair standard to analyze a
"class of one" claim).
20 Economic Opportunity Cointn'n of Nassau Cointy, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 439-41.
w See supranote 36 and accompanying text.
2 See supranote 38 and accompanying text.
2w See infra note 265 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 267-69 and accompanying text.
See infra note 288 and accompanying text.
210
See infra notes 289-90 and accompanying text.
211See infra note 290 and accompanying text.
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First, it
The following Section addresses these problems.
compares and contrasts the First and Second Circuit's "malicious intent
to injure" standard with the Seventh Circuit's "vindictive action"
standard. 212 Next, this Section reconciles the objective test for qualified
immunity with the subjective aspects of "class of one" claims.21 3 Then,
this Section addresses the conflict inherent in analyzing a constitutional
motive claim under rational basis review.21 4 It proposes that "class of
one" claims should be analyzed under a higher form of rational basis
review that would allow the court to examine motive.21 5 Finally, this
Section briefly compares and contrasts Equal Protection and Substantive
Due Process because these claims can overlap for "class of one"
21 6
plaintiffs.
A. The First and Second Circuits' "Malice or Bad Faith Intent to Injure"
Theory Compared and Contrasted with the Seventh Circuit's "Vindictive
Action" Theory
As stated earlier, the Supreme Court recognized Equal
Protection claims for non-class based discrimination in Olech; however,
the standard for "class of one" remains unclear. 2 7 Thus, it is useful to
turn to the circuit courts for guidance. The main proponents of "class of
one" litigation are the First, the Second, and the Seventh Circuits. 218
However, the First and Second Circuits recognize "class of one" claims
under the theory of selective enforcement,21 9 while the Seventh Circuit
analyzes them as a slightly different type of Equal Protection claim.220
Under these conflicting approaches, it is difficult for courts to analyze
"class of one" claims in a uniform manner. Therefore, the standards
must be carefully analyzed to determine which approach is best to use
for "class of one" claims.

212

See infra notes 217-38 and accompanying text.
'I"See iifranotes 239-86 and accompanying text.
214See infra notes 287-347 and accompanying text.
215
See infra notes 310-48 and accompanying text.
21
6 See infra notes 349-63 and accompanying text.
217Compare LeClair, 627 F.2d at 608 (finding that an Equal Protection claim for malicious
government action that is not based on membership in a protected class can be decided as a
case of selective enforcement), with Esinail, 53 F.3d at 178-179 (stating that a claim for
vindictive state action is not selective prosecution unless the plaintiff is a member of a
suspect class or exercising a fundamental right).
218See supraPart Ill.
219See supraPart ll.A.
M See supra Part ilI.B.
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While the Seventh Circuit's theoretical approach in Esmail is
similar to the First and Second Circuits, 221 this Note adopts the Seventh
Circuit's "vindictive action" theory for several reasons. 222 First, the First
and Second Circuits borrow their "malice or bad faith intent to injure"
standard from qualified immunity and selective enforcement. 23 This
combination of theories is difficult to reconcile. Selective enforcement is
an amorphous concept that is difficult to allege and prove. 224
Second, upon close inspection, it becomes apparent that the
theoretical basis for First and Second Circuit's approach is not as sound
as the Seventh Circuit's. 2
The Supreme Court modified the standard
for qualified immunity after LeClair was decided. 226 In Harlow v.
Fitzgerald,2 7 decided two years after LeClair, the Supreme Court altered
the test for qualified immunity, eliminating the subjective inquiry into
the official's motivations of malice, and adopting an objective
standard. 2
However, the LeClair court borrowed the "malice or bad
faith intent to injure" standard from the subjective test for qualified

See supra Part I1. The circuits analyze these claims under different theories, but they.use
the same language to describe the state or local conduct. See supra Part I1. For example,
the Second Circuit used the terms malice and bad faith to describe the conduct, and the
Seventh Circuit used the words vindictive and malice to refer to the official's conduct. See
supra Part III. The circuits also came to the same conclusion at the end of their analyses,
that individuals can bring an Equal Protection claim against a state or local official when
they are intentionally singled out for vindictive or malicious treatment. See supra Part Ill.
2n See infra notes 223-31 and accompanying text.
M See supra notes 143-49 and accompanying text. The first case from the Second Circuit to
use this standard was LeClair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 609-10 (2d Cir.1980). See also supra
notes 134-51 and accompanying text for the facts and the holding of LeClair.
224See supra note 140 and accompanying text. See also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 27072 (1994). In Albright, the Court noted that "the extent to which a claim of malicious
prosecution is actionable under § 1983 is one 'on which there is an embarrassing diversity
of judicial opinion."' Id. at 270 n.4 (citations omitted). Furthermore, the scholarly materials
on the subject are sparse, leaving many aspects of selective enforcement uncovered.
225See infra notes 226-31 and accompanying text.
2
6 See infra notes 258-66 and accompanying text.
- 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
= Id. at 817-18. The Harlow Court abandoned the subjective inquiry for qualified immunity
to "avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many
insubstantial claims on summary judgment." Id. at 818. Under the new test for qualified
immunity, a government official would lose his or her immunity only if he or she violated
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known. Id. See infra notes 249-66 and accompanying text for further explanation of
qualified immunity. See also Laura Owen, Immunity and Accountability in Civil Rights
Litigation: Who Should Pay?, 50 U. Prr. L. REv. 935, 969-90 (1989). In her article, Professor
Owen conducted an extensive analysis of Harlow. Id.
22

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol35/iss1/3

Richter: A Standard for "Class of One" Claims Under the Equal Protection C

2000]

A STANDARD FOR "CLASS OF ONE"

233

immunity. 229 Because the subjective prong has been abandoned, the
standard is no longer based upon current law.32 Nonetheless, cases
from the First and Second Circuits continue to use the LeClair
standard. 231 While the LeClair "malicious intent to injure" standard may
survive the change in qualified immunity analysis, it is weakened by the
Court's decision in Harlow. A better approach is to use a straightforward
Equal Protection analysis for "class of one" claims.
The Seventh Circuit provides a better theory because it utilizes a
direct approach. 232 In Esmail, the court created a "new" Equal Protection
claim. 233 Under the Seventh Circuit's approach, "class of one" plaintiffs
can bring a claim in federal court when they have been singled out for
"vindictive" treatment." 234 This standard allows for easier interpretation
and application. Furthermore, in dicta, the Supreme Court indicated
229 See LeClair,627 F.2d at 609-610. As previously stated, under the LeClair standard, the

plaintiff is required to show that "(1) the person, compared with others similarly situated,
was selectively treated; and (2) that such selective treatment was based upon impermissible
considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of
constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure." Id.
230
See infra notes 254-66 and accompanying text.
231See, e.g., Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 683-85 (2d Cir. 1995) (utilizing the
LeClairstandard to analyze a selective enforcement claim); Rubiinovitz, 60 F.3d at 910 (citing
to the LeClair standard); LaTrieste Rest. and Cabaret, Inc. v. Vill. of Port Chester, 40 F.3d
587, 590 (2d Cir. 1994) (deciding a selective enforcement claim under the LeClair standard);
Yerardi's Moody St. Rest. & Lounge, Inc., 932 F.2d at 92-94 (analyzing a selective enforcement
claim under the LeClair standard).
2-2
See, e.g., Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998), affd, 120 S. Ct.
1073 (2000) (per curiam) (analyzing a "class of one" claim under the "vindictive action"
approach); Esinail, 53 F.3d at 179-80 (finding that "class of one" claims should be evaluated
for the presence of an illicit motive).
23 Esinail, 53 F.3d at 178-80. While the Seventh Circuit rejected the First and Second
Circuit's approach based on selective enforcement, it is difficult to determine why. See
Esinail, 53 F.3d at 179 ("This case is not . .. a case of selective prosecution."). The
approaches appear to be substantively similar in all important aspects. See supra Part III.B.
This Note can only speculate that the Seventh Circuit may have been dissatisfied with the
selective enforcement/qualified immunity approach because of a different theoretical
approach to Equal Protection. In Esinail, the court stated:
[E]qual protection does not just mean treating identically situated
persons identically .... If the liquor dealers enumerated in Esmail's
complaint committed worse infractions that he was charged with but
were let off with lighter or no sanctions, this was unequal treatment. It
would not in itself establish a claim under the equal protection clause,
because nonactionable selective prosecution produces exactly such
inequalities.

The distinctive feature here . . . is that the unequal

treatment is alleged to have been the result solely of a vindictive
campaign by the mayor.
Esniail,53 F.3d at 179.
234See supra Part III.B.
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that it would be willing to accept the Seventh Circuit's theory when it
decided Village of Willowbrook v. Olech.m3
However, there are uncertainties with the Seventh Circuit's
approach as well. The Seventh Circuit does not use a traditional level of
Equal Protection scrutiny when analyzing "class of one" claims. 236 The
Seventh Circuit's "vindictive action" standard requires plaintiffs to
prove the subjective motivations of the government official, but it does
2 37
This
not state how this would work under the rational basis standard.
is problematic because in Olech, the Court indicated that it would
analyze "class of one" claims under rational basis.m Furthermore, the
Seventh Circuit's approach does not explain how its approach would be
executed when a state or local official moves for summary judgment
based upon qualified immunity.
Thus, the following subsection
integrates Equal Protection "class of one" claims with qualified
immunity.
B. Qualified Immunity
Section 1983 provides plaintiffs with a federal cause of action
against state actors for civil rights violations. 239 Congress enacted

2-5Viii.

of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct. 1073,1075 (2000) (per curiam). The Court found
that allegations of irrational and wholly arbitrary action are enough to state a claim under
the Equal Protection Clause. Id. While it did not address the Seventh Circuit's theory of
"subjective ill will;" it did not overrule it either. Id.
236
See supra Part IIl.B. A plaintiff in the Seventh Circuit is only required to show that that
the action taken by the government official was a "spiteful effort to get him" for reasons
wholly unrelated to a legitimate state objective. Olech, 120 S. Ct. at 1075. Under rational
basis review, the court must inquire whether the administrative classification is rationally
related to a legitimate government purpose. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1,15-16 (1992).
2-1See supra Part II.B. See also Wilson, supra note, at 939-40. Wilson finds that the Seventh
Circuit did not identify a specific level of Equal Protection scrutiny when it decided Olel.
Id. at 939. He speculates that the court may be saying that actions taken out of sheer spite
do not have a valid government purpose by definition. Id. at 940.
2- See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
2 Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part:
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any state or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected any citizen of the
United States . . . to the depravation

of

rights,

privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
While Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, it provides a means of
vindicating federal rights established by the Constitution or a federal statute. Jennifer L.
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Section 1983 to "interpose the federal courts between the States and the
people, as guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect the people
from unconstitutional action under color of state law, 'whether that
action be executive, legislative, or judicial."' 240 To bring a successful
claim, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) a federally protected right was
violated; and (2) the person violating the right did so under the color of
state law. 241 Plaintiffs who succeed under Section 1983 can seek civil
damages and injunctive relief against state officials and municipalities
who violate their constitutional rights.

242

Mercer & William C. Elwell, Procedural Means of Enforcement Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 88 GEO.
L.J. 1753, 1755-56 (2000). See also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) ("Section 1983
'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating
federal rights elsewhere conferred.' The first step in any such claim is to identify the
specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.") (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,
144 n.3 (1979)); Baumgardner v. County of Cook, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1042-43 (N.D. Ill.
2000) ("42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not confer substantive rights; it provides a remedy, that is, a
private cause of action, for violations of constitutional rights and rights created by federal
statute."). For example, a plaintiff in a "class of one" claim derives his substantive right
from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and enforces that right through a claim under Section 1983. See supra note 38
and accompanying text.
A claim can also be brought against a federal official under Section 1983. Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971).
Furthermore, state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear Section 1983 claims. See
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367-69 (1990). However, a Section 1983 action that is filed in
state court is usually governed by federal law. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151-53 (1988).
See also Susan N. Herman, Beyond Parity: Section 1983 and the State Courts, 54 BROOK. L. REV.
1057 (1989).
2-0 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). The Supreme Court stated a two-part test for
determining whether a private individual has acted under color of state law in Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). First, the deprivation must be caused by the
plaintiffs exercise of a right or privilege created "by the State or by a rule of conduct
imposed by the state or by a person for whom the state is responsible." Id. Second, the
defendant "must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor." Id. The Lugar
Court found that the second requirement can be satisfied with a showing that the
defendant is a state official, that he acted together with or obtained significant aid from
state officials, or that the defendant's conduct is "otherwise chargeable to the State." Id.
241Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981). See also William H. ReMine, Civil Suitsfor Civil
Rights: A Primer on § 1983, 26 COLO. LAw. 5,5 (1997); Michael C. Fayz, Civil Rights, DET. C.
L. REv. 343,345 (1995).
242 Theodore & Stewart, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641,
644-45 (1987). Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs can receive nominal damages, presumed
damages, actual damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief. ReMine, supra note 241,
at 11. A plaintiff cannot receive punitive damages against a municipality or a local
government agency, but can recover them from an official who is sued in her personal
capacity. Id. at 12. The plaintiff may also be able to recover attorney fees if she prevails. Id.
Under Section 1983, plaintiffs are not required to exhaust state remedies before filing a
claim in federal court. See Monroe v. Paupe, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961); McNeese v. Board of
Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671 (1963).
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However, aspects of a plaintiff's claim may be thwarted by the
doctrine of immunity. 243 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a court can grant state
and local officials absolute or qualified immunity.244 Absolute immunity,
which bars all legal proceedings, is most commonly granted to
legislators, 245 judges, 246 and prosecutors. 247 However, most government
officials only receive qualified immunity.248 Qualified immunity is an
affirmative defense that an official who performs discretionary functions
can raise in a summary judgment motion.249 If it is granted, it will
protect the defendant from liability for civil damages.25
243 See infra notes 244-50 and accompanying text.
244See Fayz, supra note 241, at 404. Fayz found:

[i]mmunity analysis starts with a determination as to whether a
defendant has absolute immunity. If a defendant has absolute
immunity, then not much time need be spent looking to the nature of
the wrong alleged by the plaintiff.... [However], it is not surprising
that the concept of absolute immunity is a relatively limited one and
that the Supreme Court developed the separate concept of qualified
immunity to apply in most cases involving alleged wrongdoing on the
part of public officials.
Id. While 42 U.S.C. does not provide immunity from liability on its face, the
Supreme Court applied the common law immunity defenses to Section 1983
actions in a series of cases. Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Cost of Qualified
Immunity, 64 Mo. L. REV. 123, 125-33 (1999). See also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
554 (1967).
245Teeney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951). Absolute immunity depends on the
function that the individual is performing, not the position that he or she holds. Remine,
supra note 241 at 10. Therefore, legislators have absolute immunity when they are acting
"in a field where legislators traditionally have power to act." Id. Protected legislative acts
have been defined as "an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by
which Members participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to the
consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other
matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House." Hutchinson
v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 126 (1979) (citations omitted).
216Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967).
247 Imbler v. Patchtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-28 (1976). A prosecutor will enjoy absolute
immunity for initiating and trying a criminal case, but may not have immunity for
administrative or investigative functions. Id. at 430. Absolute immunity has also been
granted to police officers who serve as witnesses under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Brisco v. LaHue,
460 U.S. 325,329-34 (1983).
248Fayz, supranote 241, at 404.
249Id. at 423 ("[Q]ualified immunity is frequently advanced in a motion for summary
judgment."); Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Recent Developments in Civil Rights, 24 IND. L. REV. 675,
677 (1991) ("[TMhe Court has made every effort to reduce the qualified immunity issue to an
objective, legal determination that can be resolved at an early stage in litigation through a
motion for summary judgment."). See also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). In
Gomnez, the Court found that the burden of pleading the qualified immunity defense rests
with the defendant. Id. A motion for summary judgment is brought under Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). To prevail on a motion for
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Most, if not all, "class of one" claims allege Equal Protection
violations by officials who have performed discretionary functions.25 1 As
such, they are candidates for qualified immunity. 25 2 While the central
focus of this Note is to create a trial standard for "class of one" claims,
the issue of qualified immunity will create many questions for lower
courts as subsequent claims are litigated. 253 Therefore, this Section will
address the qualified immunity standard before proceeding to the trial
analysis.
1. Qualified Immunity After Harlow v. Fitzgerald254
Prior to 1982, the test for determining if a government official
deserved qualified immunity consisted of two parts.5 5 A plaintiff could
overcome the qualified immunity defense under the objective prong of

the test showing that the constitutional right asserted was clearly
established and that the defendant knew or reasonably should have

summary judgment, the moving party must show that "the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law." Id.
21 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982). While qualified immunity may protect
government officials from liability for damages, it may not preclude other claims against
state or local entities. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 513 (1999). For
example, in Village ofWillowbrook v. Olech, the plaintiff filed a claim against two officials in
their individual capacity and the Village of Willowbrook. Brief for Respondent at 8, Village
of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000) (per curiam) (No. 98-1288). Even if the
court grants qualified immunity to the officials, the plaintiff may still be able to proceed
with a claim against the municipality. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658,690-91
(1978). However, municipalities are subject to suit only in situations where municipal
officials have acted pursuant to official policy or custom. Id.
251See e.g., Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 387 (7th Cir. 1998), affd, 120 S. Ct.
1073 (2000) (per curiam) (alleging that the two "high" village officials violated the
plaintiff's Equal Protection rights); Esinail, 53 F.3d at 178 (claiming that the mayor violated
the plaintiff's Equal Protection rights in violation of Section 1983); LeClair,627 F.3d at 607
(filing a Section 1983 action against a dairy farm inspector).
252
See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
253 While several cases decided after Village of Willowbrook v. Oleci, have touched upon
qualified immunity, none have addressed the issue at length. See, e.g., Bryan, 213 F.3d at
272-74 (declining to discuss the issue of qualified immunity because the officials had
already received absolute immunity); Bamingardner, 2000 WL 1100438, at *2 (discussing
qualified immunity for officials who violate statutory rights); Anderson v. City of New
York, No. CV99-418JBW, 2000 WL 1010984, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2000) (analyzing
qualified immunity as it pertains to the right not to be arrested without probable cause).
254457 US. 800 (1982).
5 See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975).
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known that he was violating that right. 2 6 Second, under the subjective
prong, a public official could lose his or her immunity if the plaintiff
could show that the action was motivated by malice or bad faith. 25 7
The Supreme Court modified the standard for qualified
immunity in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.2 In Harlow, the plaintiff sued senior
White House aides. 25 9 He contended that they had engaged in a
conspiracy to retaliate against him for his whistleblowing testimony to
Congress about problems in the Defense Department.3
After nearly
eight years of protracted discovery, White House aides filed a motion for
summary judgment based on their immunity. 261
To support this claim, the aides argued that the two part test for
qualified immunity did not provide adequate protection from meritless
lawsuits. 262 They contended that the malice or bad faith inquiry often
precluded summary judgment because an inquiry into a defendant's
state of mind created an issue of triable fact. 263 Moved by this concern,
the Court eliminated the subjective inquiry into an official's state of
mind. 2" The revised test for qualified immunity became a legal inquiry
2%Id.
237 Id. Relying on Schetter v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), Justice Powell stated that the
subjective element could be satisfied by determining "whether in light of the discretion and
responsibilities of his office, and under all of the circumstances as they appeared at the
time, the officer acted reasonably and in good faith." Wood, 420 U.S. at 330 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Second Circuit based the LeClair malice or
bad faith intent to injure standard on the subjective prong. See supra Part III.A. The
following Section will provide a more comprehensive review of the Court's decision in
Harlow and show why the Second Circuit based its standard on invalid law. See infra Part
IV.B.2.
2%457 U.S. 800 (1982). In a companion case, the Court granted President Nixon absolute
immunity from action that he may have taken. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749
(1982).
2
_wHarlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 802 (1982).
2NId. at 804-05.
261Id. at 805. The aides argued that they were entitled to absolute immunity, or in the
alternative, that they had committed no wrongdoing and were entitled to qualified
immunity. Id. at 808,813.
m6Owen, supra note 228, at 973-74 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 61, Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800 (1982) (No. 80-945)).
261Id. at 974 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 63 n.17, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)
(No. 80-945)).
261Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816-18. The Court gave several policy reasons in support of qualified
immunity. Id. at 814. It found that the "social costs include the expenses of litigation, the
diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens
from acceptance of public office." Id. See also James C. Wrenn, Jr., Comment, Passing the
Buck: The Supreme Court's Failure to Clarifij Qualified Immunity Doctrine to Protect Public
Officials from Frivolous Lawsuits, Crawford-El v. Britton, 118 S. Ct. 1584 (1998), 22 HARV. J.L
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of whether a government official "performing discretionary functions"
had violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known." 2
The modified
standard made it easier for courts to dismiss unsupported claims at the
summary judgment stage, and it continues to be the test for qualified
immunity today. 266
2. Reconciling the Objective Harlow Inquiry with Subjective Intent
The prohibition against subjective inquiries established by
Harlow is problematic when a constitutional claim requires proof of
unlawful motive or intent.267 This is especially true for "class of one"
claims where an essential component of the claim is the defendant's
unlawful intent to single the plaintiff out for vindictive or malicious
treatment. 2
However, it is possible to distinguish the defendant's
subjective knowledge of the law from the defendant's subjective intent as
an element of a constitutional claim. 269

& PUB. POL'Y 1031,1045 (1999) ("Litigating officials' motives imposes great social costs on.
society.... Lawsuits not only require officials to engage in discovery, cross-examination,
and other bothersome events, but these motive-based lawsuits also carry a stigma.").
20 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (citations omitted).
26 The Supreme Court clarified the analytical structure under which a claim of qualified
immunity should be addressed in Siegert v. Giley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991). In Siegert, the
Court articulated a two-part test for courts to apply when deciding to grant qualified
immunity. Id. at 232-33. A court must first decide if the plaintiff has alleged a clearly
established constitutional right. Id. If the official has not violated a statutory or
constitutional right, he or she is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. But, if the court finds
that there has been a constitutional or a statutory violation, it must perform the second part
of the analysis and determine whether the right was "clearly established" at the time of the
violation. Id. This is the test that the courts currently use to determine if a state official
performing discretionary functions is entitled to qualified immunity. See, e.g., Conn v.
Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999) ("[A] court must first determine whether the plaintiff has
alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all, and if so, proceed to
determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.")
(citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232-233 (1991)).
267Clay J. Pierce, Note, The Misapplication of Qualified himunity: Unfair Procedural Burdens for
Constihtional Damage Claims Requiring Proof of the Defendant's Intent, 62 FORDHAM L. REv.
1769, 1771 (1994). Pierce found that lower courts struggled to reconcile Harlow's
prohibition against subjective inquiries into the defendant's motivations where such
motivations are part of the plaintiffs claim. Id. at 1779 n.92. He speculated that this
occurred in part because the Court's decision in Harlow did not distinguish between
inquiries related to qualified immunity and inquiries related to the plaintiff s substantive
claim. Id. Prior to Craford-El, the appellate courts used varied procedural mechanisms to
evaluate these types of claims. Id. at 1778.
26 See infra Part V.

2 See Lisa R. Eskow & Kevin W. Cole, The Unqualified Paradoxes of Qualified inmmunity:
Reasonably Mistaken Beliefs, Reasonably Unreasonable Conduct, and the Specter of Subjective
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The Supreme Court addressed the objective/subjective dilemma
for the first time in Crawford-El v. Britton.270 In Crawford-El, the Court
explained that while subjective intent is irrelevant to the issue of
qualified immunity, it could remain as a necessary element of the
plaintiff's affirmative case. 271 The Court remained faithful to the holding
in Harlow when it found that the defense of qualified immunity cannot
be rebutted by evidence showing that the defendant's conduct was
malicious or improperly motivated. 2 It stated that evidence regarding
the defendant's subjective motivations is "simply irrelevant" to the
defense of qualified immunity.273

Intent That Haunts Objective Legal Reasonableness, 50 BAYLOR L. REv. 869, 891 (1998). The
authors stated:
A distinct issue from a defendant's subjective knowledge of the law is
that of the defendant's subjective intent. Furthermore, there is a
difference between a defendant's subjective motive for taking certain
actions (i.e., whether a defendant acted with malice), and a defendant's
subjective intent as an essential element of the plaintiff's alleged
constitutional violation. While Harlow proscribes inquiry into the
former, Crawford- El v. Britton has now definitively established that
Harlow does not prohibit inquiry into the latter.
Id. See also Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 124 (3d Cir. 1996) ("The subjective
inquiry that Harlow proscribes, however, is distinct from the question whether a public
official, in taking official action that but for an improper motive would not be legally
proscribed, in fact harbored the improper motive.").
m 523 U.S. 574 (1998). In Crawford-El, a prison inmate filed a law suit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against a correctional officer alleging that she misdelivered his personal possessions
after he was transferred to a different prison in retaliation for communicating with the
press in violation of his First Amendment rights. Id. at 578-79. The correctional officer
moved for dismissal of the complaint based in part on qualified immunity. Id. at 580. After
several legal proceedings, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia decided the
case en banc. Id. at 581. When evaluating his claim, the D.C. Circuit imposed a higher
pleading standard on the plaintiff, requiring him to show evidence of improper motive by
clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 584-85. The Court granted certiorari in Crawford-El,
despite the "relative unimportance of the facts," to determine the correct relationship
between the objective standard for qualified immunity under Harlow and the plaintiff's
burden of proof when an element of his or her claim depends on proof of subjective intent.
Id. at 584.
m7Id. at 589.
Mld. at 588.
2
Id. See also Eskow & Cole, supra note 269, at 893. They stated:
In other words, Crawford-El drew a fine line between the role of
subjective intent with respect to the affirmative defense of qualified
immunity-where it is irrelevant-and the role of subjective intent with
respect to the elements of a constitutional violation-where it remains a
vital element of certain civil rights suits.
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The Court continued by stating that allegations of intent are
permissible as "essential elements" of constitutional claims. 274 Thus, in
Crawford-El, the Court held that lower courts might make an inquiry into
subjective intent as long as the inquiry is focused on the underlying
27
elements of the claim and not the qualified immunity analysis. 5
However, the Court did not provide further guidance on the execution of
this inquiry, leaving the lower courts to develop the standard. 276
Currently, there is no clearly defined standard for how a
qualified immunity analysis should proceed when intent or motive is an
element of the claim.27 Some commentators have suggested that the
defendant's motivations are analytically distinct from the defendant's

2 Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 588-89. In a well supported opinion, the Court stated that the
policy reasons behind the objective standard in Harlow would not be undermined by
inquiring about an official's subjective intent as an element of a claim. Id. at 594. The Court
found that there are significant differences between "bare allegations of malice" that
provided the basis for rebutting qualified immunity under the Wood standard and
allegations of intent that are elements of constitutional claims. Id. at 592. First, the Court
stated that the inquiry under Wood was an open ended inquiry into the official's motive
that was unrelated to the deprivation of a constitutional right, while the inquiry after
Harlow was more specific. Id. Second, the Court found that the objective qualified
immunity standard eliminated motive-based claims where the official did not violate
clearly established law. Id. Third, the Court found that the substantive elements of the
constitutional claim might serve as a limit to frivolous claims if there is doubt as to the
illegality of the defendant's conduct or if the plaintiff cannot establish causation. Id. at 593.
The Court reasoned that trial courts might use their discretion to protect defendants under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 597-98. The Court suggested that trial courts
could do so by ordering a reply to the defendant's answer under Rule 7(a) or grant the
defendant's motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). Id. at 598. Finally, the
Court concluded that summary judgment will serve as an "ultimate screen" for precluding
insubstantial claims before they get to trial. Id. at 600.
2" Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 588. The Court concluded that plaintiffs were not required to
satisfy the heightened pleading standard imposed by the D.C. Court of Appeals. Id. at 589.
However, the Court did not determine whether the defendant was entitled to qualified
immunity, leaving that determination for the lower courts. Eskow & Cole, supra note 269,
at 901.
276 Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 602. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist found it both
"puzzling and unfortunate" that the Court did not address a means of harmonizing the
objective and subjective components in practice. Id. To reconcile this issue, he proposed a
test to determine qualified immunity. See infra note 278. See also Wrenn, supra note 264, at
1031 ("In Crawford-El v. Britton, the Supreme Court missed a great opportunity to clarify
the common law doctrine of qualified immunity."); Eskow & Cole, supra note 269, at 900.
Eskow and Cole explain that while the Court's decision in Crawford-El "goes to great
lengths" to explain how lower courts can weed out insubstantial claims under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, it did not provide guidance as to how evidence of subjective
intent would be reconciled with Harlow's objective standard. Id.
2" Wrenn, supra note 264, at 1044 (finding that "varied formulations" [of the qualified
immunity analysis] have been proposed by the courts).
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knowledge of the law. 2 Under this approach, subjective inquiries into
the defendant's knowledge of the law are not allowed. 279 However,
subjective inquiries regarding the elements of the claim, such as
vindictive motivations, can still occur. 20 Accordingly, in a "class of one"
claim, the court would ask whether a reasonable official in the
defendant's position would have known that she was violating the
plaintiffs Equal Protection rights when she singled her out for
differential treatment.2 8'
The court would answer this question
affirmatively because Village of Willowbrook v. Olech28 2 establishes that it

r See Pierce, supra note 267, at 1781. Pierce found that many courts have rejected the
argument that Harlow prevents inquiries into the defendant's motivations. Id. They found
that the issue of motive is analytically distinct from the defendant's knowledge of the law.
Id. Under this type of analysis, a defendant's challenge to the plaintiff's allegations of
motive merely creates an issue of fact to be resolved at trial. Id. The defendant cannot
prevent the claim from moving forward by offering a "permissible excuse " for her
conduct. Id. Pierce supports this form of analysis because "[ilf
Harlow prohibits inquiry
into the defendant's motives where such motives form the basis of the plaintiff's claim, it
effectively eliminates any civil rights action where the plaintiff must prove motive." Id. at
1782. See also Feliciano-Angulo v. Rivera-Cruz, 858 F.2d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 1988); Musso v.
Hourigan, 836 F.2d 736, 743 (2d Cir. 1988); Kenyatta v. Moore, 744 F.2d 1179, 1185 (5th Cir.
1984).
In contrast to Pierce, Justice Rehnquist answered this question in a dissenting opinion to
Crawford-El, by concluding that a government official is entitled to immunity from suit
under § 1983 if he or she can offer a legitimate reason for the decision and the plaintiff is
unable to establish by objective evidence that the official's reason is actually pretext.
Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 602. Eskow and Cole built upon this formulation of the qualified
immunity analysis to create a three part test. They would ask:
(1) did the plaintiff come forth with evidence to raise a genuine issue of
triable fact as to the existence of unconstitutional intent;'(2) if so, even
assuming the defendant may have acted, in part, out of an
unconstitutional motive, did the defendant nonetheless offer an
objectively reasonable explanation for his conduct, and (3) did the
plaintiff then provide objective evidence that the defendant's proffered
rationale is itself unreasonable or otherwise is mere pretext?
Eskow & Cole, supra note 269, at 914. Eskow and Cole recognize that while this approach
may seem "inherently paradoxical," courts must "embrace rather than resist" this conflict if
they ever hope to strike a balance between vindicating civil rights abuses and protecting
government officials from insubstantial claims. Id. at 919.
279 Pierce, supra note 267, at 1791. Pierce argued that the Harlow Court only intended to
preclude inquiries into the defendant's knowledge of the law. Id.
2w Id. at 1782-83. See also Bodensteiner, supra note 249, at 681. Professor Bodensteiner
found that a motion for summary judgment that includes a qualified immunity defense can
be defeated by a showing that there is a genuine issue as to any material fact in dispute. Id.
If this occurs, the Court should determine whether the law was clearly established for the
qualified immunity analysis, but the jury should resolve issues of fact and determine
whether the defendant acted reasonably according to established law. Id.
281See supra note 265 and accompanying text for the language that the Court used in
Harlow.
m5120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000) (per curiam).
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violates the Equal Protection Clause to intentionally single-out an
individual for disparate treatment. 283 Then, the court would analyze the
substantive elements of the claim to determine if there was a genuine
issue of material fact in dispute. 284 If there is a dispute over the factual
issue of motive, the court would deny summary judgment and allow the
case to proceed. 285
While this approach to qualified immunity does not provide the
definitive answer for officials who have allegedly violated an
individual's Equal Protection rights, it shows a possible solution. There
are several approaches to this problem,3 6 and this Note chooses one
approach as a means of demonstrating how the objective test for
qualified immunity can be harmonized with subjective intent when it is
an element of a claim. Once the objective/subjective conflict is resolved,
another problematic area for "class of one" litigation is the rational basis
test.
C. Rational Basis Review
In Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,"" the Court indicated that it
2
would use the rational basis standard to evaluate "class of one" claims. 8
However, rational basis is the most deferential form of Equal Protection
analysis. 289 When courts evaluate government actions under this
standard, they are reluctant to consider the motivations behind the
decision. 290 At first glance, this conflicts with the current approach in the

WId. at 1074-75.
22-See supra note 249 for the summary judgment standard.
n5 See Bodensteiner, supra note 249, at 681.
2mSee supra note 278.

120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000) (per curiam).
Id. at 1074. ("Our cases have recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a
'class of one' where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently
from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in
treatment.").
2
" See Saphire, supra note 63,at 605 ("[l]t is difficult to overstate but, for the purposes of this
Article important to emphasize, the degree of judicial deference entailed in... rational
basis review."). See also supra note 87.
290See, e.g., Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977)
(finding that, in general, courts refrain from evaluating legislative motives absent a
showing of arbitrariness or irrationality); Lee v. South Carolina Dept. of Natural Resources,
530 S.E.2d 112, 115 n.4 (S.C. 2000) (stating that "the actual motivations of the enacting
governmental body are entirely irrelevant" when determining the purpose and validity of
the law under Equal Protection analysis); Leon Friedman, Purpose, Intent and Motive in
Constitutional Litigation, 596 PLI/Lrr. 713, 715 (1998) (finding that "[i]nquiries into
congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter").
n7
29
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appellate courts, under which the plaintiff is required to allege that the
decision was motivated by a vindictive desire to cause harm. 291 With the
exception of Justice Breyer's concurring opinion, the Supreme Court did
292
not resolve this issue in Olech, leaving it for future cases.
But, upon closer examination, it becomes apparent that the
Court has decided other motive driven cases under the rational basis
standard. 293 In particular, the Court actively scrutinized the motivations
behind the government action in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center294 and Romer v. Evans295 However, subsequent decisions, while
not specifically overruling these cases, have weakened the proposition
that rational basis review can be used to examine the government's
motives. 296 Therefore, the following Section will begin with the Court's
findings in Cleburne, and show how motive based claims can still be
brought under the rational basis standard. 29 Then, in support of this
proposition, this Section will discuss Romer v. Evans298 and show that its
analysis can be used to evaluate "class of one" claims. 2
1. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center3 °
In Cleburne, the Supreme Court analyzed whether the City of
Cleburne violated the Equal Protection Clause when it denied a special
use permit to a group home for the mentally retarded under a local
zoning ordinance.30' The Court decided the claim under the rational

m See supra Part Ill.
Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct. 1073,1075 (2000). See also supra notes 193-96 and
accompanying text for Justice Breyer's concurring opinion.
2 See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
2 473 U.S. 432 (1985). See also Saphire, supra note 63, at 616-17. Saphire found that Cleburne
stands as a prohibition against classifications that are based on prejudice alone and has
been used by lower courts to strike down such classifications. Id.
2" 517 U.S. 620 (1996). See itifra notes 338-41 and accompanying text for the facts and the
holding of Roner.
2 See infra notes 320-30 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 300-36 and accompanying text.
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
2
"See infra notes 337-47 and accompanying text.
31473 U.S. 432 (1985).
M Id. at 447-55. In Cleburne,the Cleburne Living Center, Inc. ("Center") petitioned the City
for a special use permit to operate a group home for the mentally retarded. Id. at 436. The
Center was required to apply for a special permit under the City's zoning regulation which
required a special use permit for the construction of "hospitals for the insane or feebleminded, or alcoholic or drug addicts, or penal or correctional institutions." Id. However,
the proposed location of the Center was zoned to include other dwellings, such as
29
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review and second order review. 311 "First order" rational basis is the
traditional form in which the Court is deferential to the government's
purpose. 312 Accordingly, the Court upholds a classification as long as
there was a "plausible reason" for the classification. 313 "Second order"
rational basis emerged as the heightened form of rational basis that the
Court used in Cleburne.314 Under this form, the Court takes an "active"
role in evaluating the government's proffered reasons. 315 While some
legal commentators welcomed the Court's active role in evaluating the
government's basis for its actions, 316 others protested that the Court's
analysis went too far. 31 7 They argued that it went beyond the confines of
rational basis review and represented a dangerous invasion upon the

311Madrid, supra note 302, at 171. Madrid found that, while rational basis review is
supposed to be a uniform standard, the Court has applied rational basis review in two
distinct ways. Id.
312
Id.
3131
Id. A classic example of this form of review is Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483
(1955). Id. at 171. See also United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980). The
Court took a very deferential approach to rational basis review in Fritz, finding that it is
"constitutionally irrelevant" whether the basis for the legislation was the actual reason for
the legislation. Id. As long as there is a plausible reason for the legislature's action, the
Court's inquiry is at an end. Id.
-11 Madrid, supra note 302, at 171-72. See also City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 458 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). In a dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall wrote that the Court's form of
rational basis in Cleburne was closer to heightened scrutiny. Id. at 458. He called this form
"second order" rational basis review. Id. Marshall found that under second order rational
basis review, the Court approached classifications skeptically and suspended its judgment
until all of the facts and evidence were considered. Id. at 471-72.
-315See supra note 314. The Ninth Circuit interpreted Cleburne as creating a new level of
rational basis called "active" rational basis review. Madrid, supra note 302, at 175. Most
notably, the Ninth Circuit used active rational basis review to evaluate military policy
toward homosexuals. See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance, 895 F.2d 563,
574-77 (9th Cir. 1990); Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1164-66 (9th Cir. 1991). Under this
form of review, the court required the government to present evidence to support its
classification. See Pruitt,963 F.2d at 1166. However, it is questionable whether the Ninth
Circuit's active form of review survives later Supreme Court decisions that return to a
more deferential standard. Madrid, supra note 302 at 204-05; Saphire, supra note 63, at 628.
316See supranote 315. See also Burstyn v. Miami Beach, 663 F. Supp. 528, 533 n.1 (S.D. Fla.
1987) (finding that, after Cleburue, the Court established a trend that allowed courts to go
beyond asserted justifications for a classification and to carefully focus on the relationship
between the legislative ends and means); Coburn v. Agustin, 627 F. Supp. 983,989 (D. Kan.
1985) (finding that Cleburne "convincingly demonstrate[s]" the existence of an exacting
rational basis test).
317See Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: IntennediateScrutiny as Judicial Mininalisin,
66 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 298, 298-99 (1998) (noting the "disturbing activism" in some of the
Supreme Court's Equal Protection decisions); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 478 (Marshall, J.,
Justice Marshall found that the Court's form of rational basis was
dissenting).
"freewheeling, and potentially dangerous." Id.
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government's decision-making ability. 318 Perhaps in response to these
concerns, the Court clarified its rational basis standard in subsequent
319
cases.
One of the most important Equal Protection decisions after
Cleburne was Heller v. Doe.320 In Heller, the Court evaluated a Kentucky
statute that governed the involuntary committal of the mentally disabled
to state institutions. 321 To some commentators, Heller represented the
Court's retreat from the second order rational basis review. 322 The Court
cited to Cleburne only once to reaffirm that classifications involving the
mentally retarded are scrutinized under rational basis review. 323 In all
other aspects, the Court exercised judicial restraint when determining if
there was a rational basis for the statute, using many first order

118Id. See supra note 317. Many government decisions rely on classifications. Saphire, supra

note 63, at 600. Under a demanding level of scrutiny, no law would be immune from a
potential challenge. Id. Therefore, the courts have tried to create standards for reviewing
Equal Protection classifications that balance judicial and legislative interests. Id. at 601.
119 Saphire, supra note 63, at 622. Saphire stated that the Supreme Court clarified rational
basis review in the early 1990s. Id.
-2' 509 U.S. 312 (1993). See Saphire, supra note 63, at 622. (finding that Heller v. Doe is
probably the most important of the cases that the Supreme Court used to clarify the
rational basis standard). See also FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-14
(1993); Nordlinger v, Han, 505 U.S. 1, 11 (1992).
321Heller, 509 U.S. at 315: In Kentucky the civil commitment of the mentally retarded and
the mentally ill were determined by two separate statutes. Id. at 314. At issue in the case
was the procedural differences in the statutes. Id. First, the burden of proof at a final
commitment hearing for the mentally retarded was clear and convincing evidence, while
the burden of proof for the mentally ill was beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 315. Second,
at commitment proceedings for the mentally retarded, guardians and immediate family
members were able to participate as if they were parties to the proceeding. Id. However,
commitment proceedings for the mentally ill did not include this procedure. Id. A class of
mentally retarded persons who were involuntarily committed to Kentucky institutions
challenged these differences, alleging that they violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because they were irrational. Id.
322 Saphire, supra note 63, at 635. See also Madrid, supra note 302, at 192. Madrid found that
the Court did not to follow the Cleburae form of rational basis review. id. He speculated
that there were two reasons why the Court did not use second order rational basis review.
Id. First, he reasoned that the facts of Heller did not present the Court with a case of blatant
discrimination as Clebunre had. I.
While the classifications in both cases rested on
stereotypical attitudes toward the mentally retarded, the language in Cleburne was
stereotypical on its face. Id. at 192-93. Second, Madrid reasoned that the enactment of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 provided greater statutory protection for the
mentally retarded. Id. at 193. In part, this may eliminate the need to classify the mentally
retarded as a suspect or quasi-suspect classification. Id.
323Heller, 509 U.S. at 321.
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basis standard, finding that the mentally retarded were not a suspect
classification. 3m Its approach represented a departure from traditional
rational basis review. 303 The Court engaged in an active, rather than a
passive, analysis of the City's basis for treating the group home
differently from other homes in the immediate area.304 Instead of
according the City the traditional deference that government actors
receive, the Court conducted a "searching inquiry" into the City's
reasons for denying the permit.305 This was unusual because, under

apartment houses, fraternity or sorority houses, hospitals, nursing homes, and private
clubs. Id. at 436 n.3. After holding a hearing, the city council refused to grant the permit.
Id. at 437. The Cleburne Living Center filed a law suit against the City and its officials
alleging that the zoning ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause on its face and as it
was applied to the Center and its potential residents. Id.
W Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442. When the case was appealed to the Fifth Circuit, it determined
that mental retardation was a quasi-suspect classification that deserved intermediate
scrutiny. Id. at 437-38. The Supreme Court overruled the Fifth Circuit and listed four
reasons to support its finding that the mentally retarded should not be a quasi-suspect
class. Id. at 442-46. First, the Court stated that the state's interest in providing for 'the
mentally retarded was best left to the judgment of the legislature and health care providers
because they are better qualified to make substantive decisions about the mentally
retarded. Id. at 442-43. Second, the Court found that the mentally retarded were
adequately protected from discrimination by federal and state legislation. Id. at 443-45.
Third, the Court argued that the mentally retarded are not politically powerless as a group
because they have attracted the attention of legislators. Id. at 445. Fourth, the Court stated
that if the mentally retarded were a quasi-suspect class, it would open the door for other
groups with similar characteristics, such as the aged, the disabled, the mentally ill and the
infirm. Id. at 44545. See also Alfonso Madrid, Comment, Rational Basis Review Goes Back to
the Dentist's Chair: Can The Toothless Test of Heller v. Doe Keep Gays in the Military?, 4 TEMP.
POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 167, 174 (1994). Madrid found that the Court may have been in a
quandary when it decided Clebrie. Id. It may have approved of the Fifth Circuit's
decision; however, it did not want to "open the door" to another suspect classification. Id.
He speculates that this may be the reason why the Court gave rational basis review more
"bite." Id.
30 Doyle, supra note 63, at 403. Doyle found that the Court deviated from traditional
rational basis review in two ways. Id. First, instead of searching its "collective
imagination" to find a rational relationship to a state interest, it carefully examined the
City's reasons for treating the mentally retarded differently than other group housing
communities. Id. Second, the Court required a "high degree of correlation" between the
classification and the purpose of the ordinance. Id.
3
City of Clebune, 473 U.S. at 458 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall, who was
joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, found that the Court engaged in a "probing
inquiry" when it evaluated the statute. Id. See also Doyle, supra note 63, at 403. Doyle
found that the Court "dissect[ed] the record" when it analyzed the ordinance. Id.
-w Clebu rne, 473 U.S. at 460 (Marshal, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall felt that the Court's
approach was unfortunate because the Court did not provide guidance for determining
when a more searching inquiry should be conducted. Id. He wrote that without further
guidance, lower courts would be left in the dark and the Court would remain
unaccountable for its decisions. Id. at 459-60. See also infra note 302 for the Court's analysis
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traditional rational basis review, the state is not obligated to produce
306
evidence to defend its classification.
Most relevant to the issue of unconstitutional motivation in
Cleburne was the Court's finding that negative attitudes of surrounding
property owners toward a home for the mentally retarded would not
provide the City with a rational reason for denying the permit. 30 7 The
Court stated that negative attitudes, unsubstantiated by other factors,
would not furnish a permissible basis for treating the mentally retarded
differently.3" The Court struck down the ordinance, finding that there
was no rational basis, in part, because it was based on "irrational
prejudice" against the mentally retarded. 30 9
2. Rational Basis Review after Cleburne
After Cleburne, the Court's role in rational basis review was
unclear.310 Two forms of rational basis review emerged: first order

of the City's proposed interests. In particular, note how the Court examines each reason
carefully to determine if it is a legitimate interest.
-"Saphire, supranote 63, at 613. Saphire noted that the Court's inquiry was "odd" because
a state does not have an obligation to justify its classification under traditional rational
basis review. Id.
3w Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448. The Court also evaluated three other state interests offered by
the City. Id. at 448-50. First, the City was concerned that students at a nearby high school
would harass the occupants of the group home. Id. at 448. The Court found that such
"vague, undifferentiated fears" would not serve as a legitimate interest. Id. at 449. Second,
the City objected to the location of the group home because it was located on a five
hundred year old flood plane. Id. The Court stated that this concern could not justify
treating the mentally retarded differently since other dwellings could be located at the
same site, such as nursing homes or hospitals. Id. Third, the City was concerned with the
size and the number of occupants in to proposed Center. Id. The Court found that this
interest was unsupported because there was no evidence showing that mentally retarded
were different from other groups who possibly could occupy the site, such as nursing
home residents or fraternity brothers. Id. at 449-50.
'A Clebnirne, 473 U.S. at 448. When evaluating the negative attitudes of nearby property
owners, the Court found, "[pirivate biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law
cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect." Id.(citation omitted).
"' Id. at 450. The Court also invalidated the ordinance for the reasons stated at supra note
307.
310 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 337 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("While the Court cites
Cleburne once, and does not purport to overrule it, neither does the Court apply it, and at
the end of the day Cleburne's status is left uncertain."); Saphire, supra note 63, at 619
(finding that Cleburne created, at the minimum, a moderate degree of doctrinal confusion
and instability in the lower courts).
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concepts. 324 For example, it backed away from Cleburne when it found
that non-suspect classifications are accorded a "strong presumption of
validity." 325 Instead of actively evaluating the government's interests,
the Court found that any "reasonably conceivable" interest could
provide a rational basis for the government's action. 326 The Court also
retreated from Clebunze when it re-established that the state is not
required to provide a rational basis for its actions. 327 It stated that a
classification could be constitutional even if was supported by a
"rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data." 328
Overall, the Court found that the statute was constitutional because there
329
were "plausible rationales" for the classifications.
After Heller, it was arguable whether the Court returned to first
order rational basis review. 330 Heller restated many of the deferential
rational basis principles that signaled the return to a conservative
332
However, Cleburne is distinguishable from Heller.
approach. 331
Cleburne evaluated discrimination directed toward a particular
classification, the mentally retarded, while Heller evaluated differential

324See infra notes 325-29 and accompanying text. See also Saphire, supra note 63, at 623-24

(finding that the tone of Heller suggested a deferential approach toward rational basis

review).
-vsHeller, 509 U.S. at 319.
-2 Id. at 320 ("A classification 'must be upheld if there is any reasonably conceivable set of
facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification."') (citations omitted).
327ld.
Id. (citing FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307,315 (1993)).
'2 Heller, 509 U.S. at 333. The Court concluded that it was rational to create a higher
standard of proof for the commitment of the mentally ill because mental illness is more
difficult to diagnose. Id. at 321-24. The Court also reasoned that the disparity in the
standards was justified because the methods of treatment for the mentally retarded are less
invasive than methods used to treat the mentally ill. Id. at 324. The mentally ill are
subjected to intrusive medical and physical treatments that the mentally retarded do not
receive. Id. Overall, the Court was highly deferential in its analysis, concluding:
In sum, there are plausible rationales for each of the statutory
distinctions challenged by respondents in this case. It could be that
'the assumptions underlying these rationales are erroneous, but the
very fact that they are arguable is sufficient, on rational basis review,
to immunize the legislative choice from constitutional challenge.'
Id. (citations omitted).
3
3 Saphire, supranote 63, at 599. Saphire focused his article on the "death of Cleburne." Id.
He found that the form of rational basis employed in Cleburne was "short-lived" and that
expecting to win a case under the current rational basis standard "is like expecting to win
the lottery." Id. at 639.
331See supranotes 325-29 and accompanying text.
'32See supranote 322.
'178
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treatment within a classification. 333 This may account, in part, for the
differences in the Court's approach.
Furthermore, Heller did not
specifically overrule Cleburne. 334 Thus, active rational basis review can
still be used to analyze classifications based purely on prejudice or
vindictive motivations. 335 Recently, the Court used an active rational
basis analysis to strike down a prejudicial classification in Romer v.
Evans.336
337
3. The Reaffirmation of Second Order Rational Basis in Romer v. Evans

In Romer, the Supreme Court held that an amendment to the
Colorado Constitution, which prohibited government action to protect
homosexuals from discrimination, violated the Equal Protection
Clause. 338 The Court evaluated the amendment under the rational basis
standard, finding that "discrimination of an unusual character especially
suggest[s] careful consideration to determine whether [it is] obnoxious to
the constitutional provision." 339 The Court found that the amendment

3-.
See supra notes 301-09, 321-29 and accompanying text.
34 Heller, 509 U.S. at 337 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the Court did not purport to
overrule Cleburne when it decided Heller v.Doe). See also Saphire, supra note 63, at 628.
Professor Saphire found that while the general prospects for Equal Protection claims under
the rational basis standard look bleak, there may be limited circumstances in which the
Clebune form of rational basis review will be successful. Id. at 628-33.
3 Saphire, supra note 63, at 616-17, 628-31. Saphire stated that, even after Heller, Clebunte
can still be understood as a prohibition against classifications that are motivated by
prejudice alone. Id. at 616. He also reasoned that some classifications may still be found
irrational after Heller because the Court acknowledged that, even under the rational basis
standard, the government's interests must be grounded in reality. Id. at 631. See also Heller,
509 U.S. at 321 ("[Elven the standard of rationality as we have so often defined it must find
some footing in the realities of the subject addressed by the legislation.").
- 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
37 Id.
338Id. at 635-36. In Romer, the citizens of Colorado adopted an amendment to the state
constitution, known as "Amendment 2," in a state wide referendum.
Id. at 623.
Amendment 2 was enacted in response to ordinances that had been passed in several
municipalities prohibiting discrimination against homosexuals in areas such as housing,
employment, education, public accommodations, and health and welfare services. Id. at
623-24. Amendment 2 repealed these ordinances and prohibited all legislative, executive,
or judicial action designed to protect homosexuals. Id. at 624. Members of the homosexual
community, as well as the municipalities whose ordinances had been overturned, filed a
suit to have Amendment 2 declared invalid, alleging that it subjected them to immediate
and substantial discrimination. Id. at 625.
39 Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. The state's principal argument was that Amendment 2 merely
put gays and lesbians in the same position that all other citizens occupy. Id. at 626. The
Court found that this interest was invalid because it imposed a broad disability upon a
single named group. Id. at 632. The Court also reasoned that Amendment 2 was based
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created a disadvantage for homosexuals which gave rise to an
"inevitable inference" that the statute was motivated by animosity. 0
The Court concluded that a desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate government interest and declared that the
amendment was unconstitutional because it did not have a rational
relationship to a legitimate government interest.341
The Court's approach in Romer is very similar to Cleburne,
lending support to the proposition that second order rational basis
review survives Heller.342 The Romer Court carefully scrutinized the
rationality of Colorado's amendment, looking beyond any conceivable
rational basis to evaluate the motivations behind the amendment. 343
While Heller established that the state is not required to provide evidence
to support the rationality of its classification, 3" heightened scrutiny of
the government's interest is still permissible where animosity or
prejudice form the basis for a classification. 345
Thus, Romer supports the application of a heightened form of
rational basis review to "class of one" claims. Like the plaintiffs claim in
Romer, the core allegation of a "class of one" claim is vindictive or
irrational treatment.346 While "class of one" plaintiffs are the victims of
non-class based discrimination, the Court in Village of Willowbrook v.
Olech,347 indicated that the principles that apply to classifications can also

upon animosity toward homosexuals, which can never be the basis for government action.
Id. at 634-35.

M Id.at 634.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) ("[l]f the constitutional conception of 'equal
protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare. . desire
to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate government interest.")
(quoting Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
342 This argument is even more compelling under the theory that the levels of Equal
Protection scrutiny are not discrete categories, but rather a continuum. See supia note 63. If
Equal Protection review is viewed as a continuum of increasing scrutiny, it is possible to
have different levels of analysis within a particular form of review, such as rational basis.
3
See supranotes 338-41 and accompanying text.
344 Heller, 509 U.S. at 320. See also Madrid, supra note 302, at 204-05 (finding that, after
Heller, it is clear that there is no burden on the government to justify the rationality of its
decision).
MDoyle, supra note 63, at 404-08. Doyle argued that a more exacting level of rational basis
scrutiny should be employed where the rights of a disfavored group are involved. Id. at
408. He found that this would give the courts the flexibility to "probe the motivations
behind suspicious discriminatory action." Id.
6 See supraPart III.
37 120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000) (per curiam).
31
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be used to evaluate "class of one" claims. 8 Therefore, the Romer form of
rational basis review that scrutinizes the government's motivations can
be used to evaluate "class of one" claims. The Model Judicial Reasoning
will further explain how the approach from Rower can be used to analyze
"class of one" claims. However, before proceeding to the Model Judicial
Reasoning, this Note will discuss the relationship between Equal
Protection and Substantive Due Process with regard to "class of one"
claims.
D. Substantive Due Process
Individuals who experience vindictive state action may have an
additional claim under the Substantive Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 349 Like the Equal Protection Clause, the
Substantive Due Process Clause protects fundamental rights. 35°

See also Banigarduer, 2000 WL 1100438, at *13-15 (finding that although
Cleburne and Rower involved classifications, the reasoning in those cases is applicable to
"class of one" claims).
.49 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Due Process Clause states, "[N]or shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " Id. The
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the source of three different types of
constitutional protection. CHENIERINSKY, stipra note 53, at 419-20. The first type of Due
Process protection incorporates specific provisions named in the Bill of Rights. Rosalie
Berger Levinson, Protection against Governinent Abuse of Power: Has the Court Taken the
Substance out of Substantive Due Process, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV. 313 (1991). The Supreme
Court incorporates these provisions through the concept of liberty. Id. This means that the
states, as well as the federal government, must obey the commands of the Bill of Rights.
See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
The second type of Due Process recognized by the Supreme Court, and the type
addressed in this Note, is Substantive Due Process. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 53 at 420.
This form of Due Process prohibits the government from engaging in arbitrary actions
regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them. See Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-99 (1977).
The third type of Due Process is a guarantee of fair procedures, and is referred to as
Procedural Due Process. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 53 at 419. Under Procedural Due
Process, a state may not execute, imprison, or fine a defendant without a fair trial, nor may
the state deprive a person of their property without adequate procedural safeguards. See
Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 499-501 (1972); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972).
30 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 53, at 639. Professor Chemerinsky has noted that most of the
fundamental rights have been protected under both the Due Process and the Equal
Protection Clauses. Id. For example, the Supreme Court has held that the right to
contraceptives is protected under Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process. Compare
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972) (upholding the right to use contraception
under the Equal Protection Clause), with Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,68485 (1977) (finding that the right to use contraception is a protected liberty interest under
Due Process). Professor Chemerinsky found that there is not much to distinguish as to
whether the Court uses Equal Protection or Substantive Due Process to protect a
148Id. at 1074.
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35 1
Fundamental rights under Substantive Due Process include marriage,
procreation, 35 2 and familial privacy.35 3 In addition to fundamental rights,
the Substantive Due Process Clause also protects individuals from
arbitrary government conduct. 354 Thus, many "class of one" plaintiffs
may be able to allege a Substantive Due Process violation in addition to
an Equal Protection claim. While Equal Protection and Substantive Due
Process are defined differently, in certain situations there is an overlap
between the theories. 355 First, however, it is important to highlight why
they are different.

fundamental right, because under either provision strict scrutiny is generally used.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 53, at 639.
-1 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
352
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,849 (1992); Carey, 431 U.S. at 688-89;
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Griswold,381 U.S. at 485; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
-33See, e.g., Moore, 431 U.S. at 499; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518 (1925); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
3m See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) (emphasizing that "the
touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of the
government"). In Lewis, the Court analyzed the plaintiff's claim under the "shocks the
conscience" standard. Id. at 846. Under this test, behavior that "is so egregious, so
outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience" will violate
Due Process. Id. at 848 n.8. The Court found that this inquiry is circumstance based,
dependant on the totality of the facts. Id. at 850. See also Michael J. Phillips, The Nonprivacy
Applications of Substantive Due Process, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 537, 576-77 (1990). In his article,
Phillips outlined the various tests used to evaluate substantive due process claims. Id. He
found that courts use rational basis review for social and economic regulations, prison
regulations, and in public employment cases. Id. at 576. Courts use the arbitrary or
capricious standard in public employment cases and land use cases. Id. The shocks the
conscience standard is used for miscellaneous claims, while factor-based balancing tests are
used primarily in excessive force cases. Id. Courts are also deferential to professional
standards test to evaluate the treatment of patients in mental institutions, and a reckless or
deliberate indifference standard to evaluate special relationship cases. Id. at 576-77.
355See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 53, at 639; Paul D. Wilson, Nasty Motives: A Considerationof
Recent FederalDamages Claims in Land-Use Cases, 31 URB. LAw 937, 938 (1999) (stating that
landowners often use Due Process and Equal Protection claims to challenge municipal
action); Christopher R. Bryant, Comment, Zoning Out Due Process Rights: W.].F. Realty Corp.
v. Town of Southhampton, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 565 (1999) (explaining that failure to apply
zoning regulations, building, and housing codes in a rational manner may result in liability
under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses). See also Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860
F.2d 1317, 1329 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[linvidious discrimination prohibited by the equal
protection clause . . . also constitutes an arbitrary and capricious depravation of the
individual's liberty interest."); Benigni v. City of Hemet, 879 F.2d 473, 478 (9th Cir. 1988)
("IT]he due process and equal protection theories in this case are practically identical, both
being grounded on the allegation of arbitrary law enforcement activity.").
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The Equal Protection Clause is violated when the government
intentionally treats persons who are similarly situated differently, 356
while the Due Process Clause is violated when the government treats
someone irrationally, even if it treats everyone similarly.357 Substantive
Due Process claims are also distinguishable from Equal Protection claims
because some courts require a Substantive Due Process plaintiff to show
that the government arbitrarily deprived them of a liberty or a property
interest.35 These two claims can overlap, however, when a government
official takes vindictive action against an individual, treating him
differently from others who are similarly situated.3 5 9 There are several
cases in which plaintiffs have alleged Equal Protection and Substantive
360
Due Process violations.
However, Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process are
distinct claims with different elements.3 1 While there is some overlap

- See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
-7 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 53, at 639. See also Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437
U.S. 117, 125 (1978) (noting that plaintiffs raised only Substantive Due Process claims
because similarly situated persons were treated the same in their allegations).
-158
Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Suibstantive Doe Process Analysis, 26 U.S.F. L. REv. 625, 626
(1992) ("Substantive due process only applies if the challenged government action affected
an interest protected by the due process clauses, namely, life, liberty, or property."). See
also Front Royal and Warren County Indust. Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, Virgina,
135 F.3d 275, 288 (4th Cir. 1998); Mackenzie v. City of Rockledge, 920 F.2d 1554, 1558 (11th
Cir. 1991); DiMartini v. Ferrin, 906 F.2d 465, 467 (9th Cir. 1990); Nolin v. Douglas County,
903 F.2d 1546, 1553-54 (11th Cir. 1990); Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1435 (5th Cir.
1990); Colon v. Schneider, 899 F.2d 660, 666-67 (7th Cir. 1990). But cf J. Michael
McGuinness & Lisa A. McGuinness Parlagreco, The Reemergence of Substantive Due Process as
a Constitutional Tort: Theonj, Proof and Damages, 24 NEW ENG. L. REv. 1129, 1133 (1990)
("Substantive due process rights are not dependant upon property rights under state law
as in the case of procedural due process rights.").
359
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 53, at 639.
3 See Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1258 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that both Due Process
and Equal Protection claims are properly alleged); Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d
1409, 1414 (4th Cir. 1983) (finding that there was standing to plead Equal Protection and
Substantive Due Process claims for the denial of a building permit); Sternaman v. County
of McHenery, 454 F. Supp. 240, 250 (N.D. Il. 1978) (stating that Equal Protection and Due
Process were denied by the arbitrary refusal to renew the permit of a disfavored non-

minority).
m' Bryant, supra note 355, at 565. Bryant explains that while a plaintiff may have a claim
under both Equal Protection and Due Process, it will be easier for a plaintiff in the Second
Circuit to prevail under an Equal Protection claim. Id. See also Exxon Corp. v. Governor of
Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 124-25 (1978); Browning-Ferris Indus. of South AtI., Inc. v. Wake
County, 905 F. Supp. 312, 324 (holding that county's denial of sewer line violated plaintiff s
right to Substantive Due Process, but not plaintiff's Equal Protection rights).
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between the two theories, they are not identical. 362 A plaintiff may be
able to show that he was treated differently from others similarly
situated, but he may not have a protected liberty or property right that
would allow him to bring a Substantive Due Process claim.363 With the
similarities between Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process in
mind, this Note now turns to a standard for "class of one" claims.
V. A MODEL JUDICIAL

REASONING FOR EQUAL PROTECTION "CLASS OF ONE"
CLAIMS

This Section proposes a Model Judicial Reasoning for federal and
state courts to apply when they evaluate "class of one" claims. 364 A
uniform approach to "class of one" jurisprudence will eliminate the
confusion that currently exists among the appellate courts.365 While the
Seventh Circuit provides a viable approach, it does not use the rational
basis standard. 366 Therefore, the Model Judicial Reasoning combines
aspects of the Seventh Circuit's "vindictive action" approach with the
traditional elements of rational basis review.
Furthermore, the proposed Reasoning strikes a balance between
the competing concerns of individual rights and government
discretion.3 6 7 The Romer rational basis standard provides this balance. It

32 See Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317, 1328 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding that "the concepts of
equal protection and substantive due process are defined differently [even though they are]
very similar concepts"); Kevin v. Thompson, No. 99C 7882, 2000 WL 549440, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
May 1, 2000) (finding that a plaintiff must allege more than irrational and arbitrary action
to show improper motive in a "class of one" claim).
16 See e.g., Thigpen v. Bibb County, 216 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2000) ("[O]nly the due
process clause alludes to property and liberty. In contrast, the applicability of the equal
protection clause is not limited to only those instances in which property and liberty
interests are implicated."); John Corp. v. City of Houston, 214 F.3d 573, 577 n.2 (5th Cir.
2000) ("Unlike the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause does not require that
the governmental action work a deprivation of a constitutionally protected property or
liberty interest.").
3 This Note proposes a standard for both state and federal courts because state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to hear claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See supra note 239.
ms See supra Part III for the ways in which the Appellate Courts currently analyze "class of
one" claims for vindictive state action.
3
6See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
37 For a discussion of the balance between individual rights and the discretionary interests
of government officials see Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 590-91 (1998), Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813-14 (1982), and Butz v. Econoinou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978). In
Harlow, the Supreme Court recognized that in situations where government officials abuse
their power, an action for damages may be the only realistic alternative that some
individuals have. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813-14. However, the Court stated that individual
interests had to be balanced against the costs that government officials must bear as the
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realizes the need to protect the plaintiff's civil rights by allowing the fact
finder to examine the motives behind the state or local action.'3 At the
same time, it remains deferential toward the government's need to make
decisions without the fear of protracted litigation by asking if there is a
legitimate rational basis for the decision. While it is arguable that
discriminatory behavior toward individuals is not as historically
documented or severe as discrimination toward groups, such as the
mentally retarded or homosexuals, it is important to remember that
individuals, standing alone against a vast government bureaucracy, are
369
significantly outmatched.
Finally, the presence of a "vindictive action" element will ensure
that insubstantial claims do not turn into constitutional violations. 370 If
plaintiffs fail to allege spite or ill will, their claim may be dismissed
under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or
under a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. 371 Officials are also
protected from liability in their individual capacity under qualified
immunity. 372 This presents another substantial hurdle for plaintiffs to
overcome.
These elements, combined with the great amount of
deference accorded to government actions, even under second order
rational basis review, will give a plaintiff's attorney much to consider
373
before filing a "class of one" claim.

result of litigation. Id. at 814. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text for the facts
and the holding of Harlow.
See also Saphire, supra note 63, at 601. Professor Saphire also found that a conflict exists
between judicial and legislative functions when a court examines legislation. Id. The
response has been to apply three levels of scrutiny to Equal Protection claims and to use
the appropriate level for each claim. Id. This approach can also apply to executive and
administrative decisions, creating a balance of power between the executive and judicial
branches on a broad level and between judges and state actors on a more specific level. See
supranotes 92-98.
3H A federal cause of action will provide additional protection for "class of one" claimants.
Powerful government officials are often allied with local state court judges, making it
difficult for individuals to overcome this balance in political power. McGuinness, supra
note 17, at 336. Access to the federal courts will provide an unbiased forum for their claim.
Id.
3' See supra note 172.
-170
See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
171See supra note 35 and 249 for Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 standards.
-72See supra notes 243-50 and accompanying text.
373See Wilson, supra note 355, at 940. Wilson stated that under the Seventh Circuit's
"vindictive action" requirement, "most landowners, if they have competent legal advice,
[will not] race off to court seeking damages on the first occasion that they cross swords
with municipal officials." Id.
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The following Section provides an analytical framework for
analyzing "class of one" claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This
Note will use the facts of Ms. Olech's lawsuit against the Village of
Willowbrook to illustrate how the analysis proceeds. The Model Judicial
Reasoning provides the steps for analyzing a claim once it has proceeded
to trial; thus, it assumes that the court has already performed the
qualified immunity analysis and the claim has survived a motion for
374
summary judgment.
Step One. To establish a prima facie "class of one" claim, the
plaintiff must show that:
(A) She was intentionally singled out from others who were
similarly situated; and
(B) She was singled out solely because of the official's
vindictive motivations or ill will towards her.
Commentary
Under the rational basis standard, the plaintiff has the burden of
establishing disparate treatment. 375 For "class of one" plaintiffs, this
burden consists of two parts. Under Part A, the plaintiff must prove
that the official intentionally singled her out from others who are
similarly situated. The first part of the plaintiff's burden complies with
the Supreme Court's holding in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech.376 In
Olech, the Court found that a "class of one" plaintiff must allege that she
was intentionally treated differently from others who are similarly
situated. 3 7 Intent is an essential element of Part A. It is a core element

374See supra notes 277-85 and accompanying text for an explanation of how a court could
conduct the qualified immunity analysis.
.'17See Viii. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 1074 (2000) (per curiam) (finding that a
"class of one" plaintiff must allege that "she has been intentionally treated differently from
others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment");
Greer v. Amesqua, 212 F.3d 358, 370 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that a plaintiff alleging an
Equal Protection violation has the burden of showing that "(1) he is otherwise similarly
situated to members of the unprotected class; (2) he was treated differently from members
of the unprotected class; and (3) the defendant acted with discriminatory intent");
Edwards v. Johnson, 209 F.3d 772, 780 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that to bring an Equal
Protection claim, a plaintiff must prove the existence of "purposeful discrimination").
376120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000) (per curiam).
'17 Id. at 1074. See also Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 533 (10th Cir. 1998)
("[A]t the heart of any equal protection claim must be an allegation of being treated
differently than those similarly situated.").
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of all equal protection claims 378 and, generally, government officials are
protected from lawsuits based upon negligent action.3 79
Furthermore, it is necessary for the plaintiff to show that she was
singled out from others similarly situated. This is another essential
element for Equal Protection cases; without it, the plaintiff will not have
a valid claim.38 ° To determine if the plaintiff is similarly situated with
other relevant persons, the court should look at the "relevant aspects" of
those who are in a comparable situation to determine if they are
"roughly equivalent." 381
In addition to intent, the Olech Court found that the plaintiff
must establish that there was no rational basis for the treatment.M2 Part
B of the plaintiff's burden of proof satisfies this requirement. It
incorporates the Seventh Circuit's "vindictive action" theory with the
rational basis standard. If the plaintiff can show that the decision to
single her out was based purely on the desire to vindictively single her
out, it follows that there is no rational basis for the decision.38 3 In Village

M See Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265 (finding that it is "well established" that a
plaintiff is required to show intent or purpose for an Equal Protection violation). See also
supra note 375. The requirement of intentional or purposeful discrimination is reflected in
early "class of one" claims and has continued to be an element of the plaintiffs prima facie
case in recent decisions. See stipra Parts lI.B. and Ill.
-7 See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (finding that plaintiffs cannot bring a
constitutional claim for negligent government action); Lemoine v. New Horizons Ranch
and Ctr., Inc., 174 F.3d 629, 635 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that a violation of federal law does
not create a cognizable Section 1983 claim if defendant merely acted negligently).
M See supra notes 60 and 375 and accompanying text. However, a plaintiff who is unable to
prove this element may still have a claim for vindictive treatment under Substantive Due
Process. See supra Part IV.D.
ml Economic Opportunity Comm'n v. CEDC, 106 F.Supp.2d 433,439 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). The
Court noted, that "the test is whether a prudent person, looking objectively at the incidents,
would think them roughly equivalent and the protagonists similarly situated." Id. This
standard is similar to the test that the Second Circuit used in Rubinovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d
906, 909-10 (1st Cir. 1995). In Rubinovitz, the court found that an Equal Protection plaintiff
must allege that they were singled out from others who were similarly situated "in all
relevant aspects." Id. See also supra note 154 and accompanying text.
382 Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 1074 (2000) (per curialn).
38 Under the Seventh Circuit's approach, a single act can provide the basis for an Equal
Protection claim. See Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998)
(finding that an "orchestrated campaign" was not essential to the plaintiff's claim), affd,
120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000) (per curiam). This contrasts with the First Circuit's approach in
Rubinovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906, 912 (1st Cir. 1995), where the court looked for an
"orchestrated campaign causing substantial harm." Id. This Note takes the position that a
single act will be sufficient for a "class of one" claim and it speculates that the First Circuit
may have also taken this position if Olecli was available for their analysis.
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8
of Arlington Heights,3
the Supreme Court identified several factors that
can be used to determine intent or the motivations behind government
action.38 5 These factors include, but are not limited to:

(1) the historical background of the decision;386
(2) the specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged
decision;mr
(3) departures from the normal procedural sequence;39 and
(4) the legislative or administrative history of the action.38 9
Under Part A of this Section, Ms. Olech will have to show that
Village Officials intentionally singled her out from others who are
similarly situated for discriminatory treatment and that this treatment
was motivated by ill will. The fact finder could begin this analysis by
determining if Ms. Olech was singled out from others who are in a
position that is "roughly equivalent" to Ms. Olech's. To support this
allegation, Ms. Olech could demonstrate that other occupants of single
family homes in the Village of Willowbrook were not required to
provide a thirty-three foot easement for water services. If the fact finder
concludes that Ms. Olech was singled out from others similarly situated,
it would proceed to the Part B of the analysis, and determine if Ms. Olech

- 429 US. 252 (1977).
m Id. at 265-69.

In Arlington Heights, the Court found that a plaintiff is not required to

prove that the challenged action was based solely on discriminatory intent. Id. at 265. This
differs from the Seventh Circuit's requirement for "class of one" plaintiffs, who must show
that the alleged discrimination action was taken purely for vindictive reasons. See supra
notes 176-186 and accompanying text. However, Arlington Heights was a case that involved
racial discrimination, which receives strict scrutiny. Id. at 264-65. See also supranote 68 and
accompanying text. "Class of one" claims only receive rational basis scrutiny, and this may
account for the difference in the plaintiff's burden of establishing causation.
mArlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267. See also Yeshiva Chofetz Chiam Radin, Inc. v. Vill. of
New Hempstead, 98 F. Supp. 2d 347, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). The Yeshiva court interpreted
Arlington Heights to include six factors for determining discriminatory purpose:
[T]he historical background of the decision, the specific sequence of
events leading up to it, departures from the normal procedural
sequence, substantive departures from factors usually considered
Important by the decisionmaker, the legislative or administrative
history (including contemporary statements of decisionmakers), and in
extraordinary circumstances, testimony concerning the purpose of
official action (subject to the possible limitations of legislative
immunity).
Id. This Note chooses to limit the factors to those that are the most relevant to
"class of one" claims for simplicity.
W Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267.
3N Id.
3" Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252 at 268.
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successfully alleged that she was intentionally singled out for vindictive
treatment. At this point, the intent and the motive elements would
merge together because there is a significant overlap between the two
concepts. 390 An action that is motivated by ill will is also intentional.
Therefore, it is more efficient to try these elements together.
To support her "class of one" claim, Ms. Olech could rely on the
Arlington Heights factors to show an illicit motive. Under the historical
background factor, she could present evidence regarding her prior
lawsuit against the Village. 391 Ms. Olech would emphasize that the
lawsuit was bitterly contested and generated substantial ill will towards
her. 392 This evidence would show a possible motivation for singling her
out for vindictive treatment. It could also establish that the Village's
decision was not the result of negligence. Similarly, this evidence could
be used to prove the second factor, the specific sequence of events
leading up to the challenged decision. Ms. Olech could show that the
lawsuit occurred prior to the Village's decision to single her out for a
thirty-three foot easement, proving that the subsequent decision was
motivated by the ill will from the law suit.
Furthermore, Ms. Olech could present evidence that the Village
departed from its normal procedural sequence to satisfy the third factor.
She would show that the Village's normal standard was to ask for a
fifteen foot easement, while it required her to provide a thirty-three foot
easement.3 93 Finally, Ms. Olech could show that the administrative
history regarding the Village's decision proves unlawful intent or malice.
As evidence, Ms. Olech could introduce the letter from the Village
attorney conceding that a fifteen foot easement would be sufficient. 394 If
the judge or the jury is satisfied that Ms. Olech successfully met her
39 5
burden of proof, Step Two would be implemented.

m0While there is a significant overlap between motive and intent for the purposes of this
analysis, this Note does not mean to imply that the concepts are the same. Black's Law

Dictionary defines motive as "[s]omething, esp[eciallyl a willful desire that leads one to
act," while it finds that "intent is the state of mind accompanying an act." BLAcK's LAw
DICTIONARY 1034, 813 (7th ed. 1999).
It distinguishes motive from intent, stating
"[w]hereas motive is the inducement to do some act, intent is the mental resolution or
determination to do it." Id. at 813.
1"1 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
- See siupra note 15 and accompanying text.
3 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
31 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
- At this point in the trial, either party may move for a judgement as a matter of law under
Rule 50. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50. It states, in pertinent part:
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Step Two. After the plaintiff has satisfied her burden of proof,
the court shall inquire whether there is a rational
relationship between the disparate treatment and the
official's purpose for such treatment. To do so, the fact
finder shall:
(A) Identify the government interest; and
(B) Examine whether the interest is rationally related to a
396
legitimate purpose.
Commentary
Under this standard, the fact finder must first identify a
government interest. 397 This interest does not have to be the actual
interest behind the official's decision, but it must be a plausible
interest. 39 However, the inquiry would not end here. Under Step B, the
court or the jury would utilize the approach from Cleburne to determine
if the interest was legitimate or if it was merely a pretext for vindictive or

(1) If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and
there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to
find for that party on that issue, the court may determine the issue
against that party and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of
law against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot
under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a
favorable finding on that issue.
(2) Motions for judgment as a matter of law may be made at any time
before submission of the case to the jury. Such a motion shall specify
the judgment sought and the law and the facts on which the moving
party is entitled to the judgment.
Id. When a court decides a motion for judgment as a matter of law, it must review all of the
evidence in the record. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2110
(2000). The court is required to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party, and it is not allowed to make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Id. If
the motion is unsuccessful, the court should proceed to Step Two of the Model Judicial
Reasoning.
39 Madrid, supra note 302, at 198-99. Madrid stated that the first step in rational basis
review is identifying a legitimate government interest. Id. at 198. The second step is
determining if that interest is rationally related to a legitimate interest. Id. at 199.
9 After Heller v. Doe, the government no longer has the burden of presenting legitimate
interests to the fact finder. See supra note 344 and accompanying text. However, Professor
Saphire found that while the government is not required to defend its actions, it is not
precluded from doing so. See Saphire, slipra note 63, at 612 n.95. He stated that defense
attorneys may find it advantageous to offer a purpose for the action because rational basis
review is so deferential that it will almost always be possible to find a plausible purpose.
Id.
3" See supra note 329.
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irrational motivation. 3 9 This inquiry would involve weighing the
Arlington Heights factors against the stated interest. The court or jury
would have to determine if the evidence established proof of an
illegitimate motive, or if the government's interest was the true
motivation for the disputed action. This step is crucial to the plaintiff's
case. Without it, it would be futile for many "class of one" plaintiffs to
file a law
suit because it is very easy to manufacture a "legitimate"
interest.400
If the fact finder concludes that the government's decision was
motivated by an illegitimate desire to harm the plaintiff, it would
conclude that there was no rational basis for the action. The court should
find in favor of the plaintiff and award appropriate damages. 401 But, if
the fact finder remains unconvinced by the plaintiff's evidence of
improper motive, it should conclude that the interest was legitimate and
that there was a rational basis for treating the plaintiff differently.
In Ms. Olech's case, the court or the jury would begin by
identifying a plausible reason for the Village's actions. For example, one
plausible reason is that the Village singled-out Ms. Olech for a thirtythree foot easement to widen the road for public use.4 2 Under the
4°
rational basis standard, this could qualify as a valid social interest.
This interest would be weighed against the evidence that Ms. Olech
presented in Step One. The fact finder would have to determine if the ill
will generated by Ms. Olech's prior law suit and the Village's deviation
from its policy of requiring a fifteen foot easement can provide the basis
for finding an illegitimate motive. In Ms. Olech's situation, it appears
likely that the Village singled her out for discriminatory treatment based
4°4
on ill will. However, the ultimate determination has yet to be made.

39 This approach is based upon Romter v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). See supranotes 337-341
and accompanying text for the facts and analysis of Roiner.
4w See supra note 396.
4m See supra note 242 for the types of damages that are recoverable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
4 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
4"n The states are given wide latitude to regulate social and economic matters under the
rational basis standard. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
404 In Village ofWillowbrook 7?Olech, 120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000) (per curiam), the Court upheld the
Seventh Circuit's finding that Ms. Olech had presented a claim sufficient to survive a
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Id. at 1075. The case is currently pending.
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V1. CONCLUSION

Currently, there is no clear standard for analyzing "class of one"
claims. The Supreme Court's decision in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech
leaves many unanswered questions. This Note proposes that "class of
one" claims should be analyzed under a heightened form of rational
basis review. This approach is consistent with the Court's decision in
Romer v. Evans. It combines elements of the Seventh Circuit's "vindictive
action" approach with the traditional elements of the rational basis
standard. An analysis of the motivations behind the disputed action will
simultaneously provide plaintiffs with a viable claim and protect the
government's interest in policy making. Plaintiffs will still have a
difficult case to prove. However, a heightened rational basis standard
will make it possible for them to have their day in court.
Nicole Richter
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